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ACTIVE  JUDGING  AND  ACCESS  TO  JUSTICE
Anna E. Carpenter*
“Being a good judge in this environment means unlearning what you learned in law school
about what a judge is supposed to do.  Fairness is doing things a federal judge would never do.”
Active judging, where judges step away from the traditional, passive role to assist those
without counsel, is a central feature of recent proposals aimed at solving the pro se crisis in
America’s state civil courts.  Despite growing support for active judging as an access to justice
intervention, we know little, empirically, about how judges interact with pro se parties as a
general matter, and even less about active judging.  In response, this Article contributes new data
and a new theoretical framework: three dimensions of active judging.  These dimensions capture
a judge’s role in adjusting procedures, explaining law and process, and eliciting information.
The study is based on a District of Columbia administrative court where most parties are pro se
and active judging is permitted and encouraged.  Using in-depth, qualitative interviews with
judges in this court, the study asks: Are the judges active?  If so, how?  Do views and practices
vary across the judges?  What factors shape and mediate those views and practices?  Results
reveal that all judges in the sample are active in some way, but judges’ practices vary in mean-
ingful ways across the three dimensions.  While all judges are willing to adjust procedures, they
differ in whether and how they explain the law or elicit information.  These variations are based
on judges’ different views about the appropriate role of a judge in pro se matters, views that are
mediated by substantive law—burdens of proof, in particular.  The variations exist though the
judges draw on shared sources of guidance on active judging: appellate caselaw, a regulatory
body, and one another.  This study suggests refinements to current thinking about active judg-
ing, offers new insights about the roles procedural rules and burdens of proof play in pro se
litigation, and suggests that consistency in active judging may require more substantial guidance
than that available to judges in this court.
© 2017 Anna E. Carpenter.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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INTRODUCTION
The adversary process, that core feature of American justice, has all but
disappeared from our state civil courts.  More accurately, the rules and norms
of the adversary system remain in place, but the advocates are largely missing.
Our nation’s civil courtrooms are no longer the province of lawyers, but of
unrepresented people, many of whom are low-income and deeply vulnerable.
Some scholars now refer to our state civil courts as the “poor people’s
courts.”1  In these courts, cases most often involve family, housing, small
claims, foreclosure, and consumer matters.2  Two scenarios dominate the
landscape: cases where only one party has counsel and cases where neither
party has counsel.3  Both represent a serious crisis for our justice system and
the people whose rights and lives are at stake as they navigate the complexity
of civil litigation on their own.4
A critical mass of scholars and experts now argue that court reform,
including reform of the judge’s role, could help solve the pro se crisis in civil
justice.5  Reform proposals go by different names, such as “active judging,”
1 See, e.g., Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’
Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 79, 83 (1997); Elizabeth L.
MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts, 22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 473, 476 (2015); Jessica Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47
CONN. L. REV. 741, 746 (2015).
2 See MacDowell, supra note 1, at 475.
3 New national research shows that in 76% of nonfamily civil cases (including con-
tract, tort, and property), at least one party has no representation.  The vast majority are
defendants. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN
STATE COURTS iv (2015).  In family law matters, the numbers are even more staggering; in
some dockets, 80% to 90% of all litigants are without counsel. See Steinberg, supra note 1,
at 751.  For an empirical and theoretical discussion of representation imbalances in civil
litigation, see Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Lawyers, Power, and
Strategic Expertise, 93 DENV. L. REV. 469, 484, 505–07 (2016).
4 A significant body of literature explores how pro se litigants experience the civil
justice system and the role and effectiveness of legal representation. See, e.g., Rebecca L.
Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise: Understanding Relational and Substantive Expertise
Through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 909, 910 (2015) (using theories of professional
expertise to understand how lawyers affect case outcomes based on a meta-analysis of
existing studies of lawyers’ impact; finding that lawyers may affect case outcomes “less by
knowing substantive law than by being familiar with basic procedures”); Shanahan et al.,
supra note 3, at 481–82, 507–12 (reviewing literature on the impact of representation, R
which generally shows better case outcomes for parties with representation as compared to
those without, and proposing a theory of strategic expertise to explain lawyer effective-
ness); Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled
Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 453, 456–58 (2011) (examining the effec-
tiveness of unbundled legal services).
5 See, e.g., CYNTHIA GRAY, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, REACHING OUT OR OVERREACHING:
JUDICIAL ETHICS AND SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (2005) (asserting active judging does not
violate ethics or compromise the impartial adjudicator role when judges have guidance);
JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND
GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS (1998); RICHARD ZORZA, THE SELF-HELP
FRIENDLY COURT: DESIGNED FROM THE GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE WITHOUT LAWYERS
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“affirmative judging,” “engaged judging,” and “engaged neutrality,” but all
refer to a model of judging that sets aside traditional judicial passivity in favor
of some form of judicial intervention or activity to assist people without coun-
sel.  I use the term “active judging” to identify such proposals.6  To illustrate
the type of activity contemplated by those calling for judicial role reform,
imagine an unrepresented person who fails to lay a proper foundation for a
(2002) (suggesting how to design a court for pro se litigants); Rebecca A. Albrecht et al.,
Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants, 42 JUDGES’ J. 16 (2003) (call-
ing for judicial role reform and proposing best practices); Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring Access
to Justice: The Role of the Judge in Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York
City’s Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 659 (2006) (focusing on the New
York City Housing Court as an example of the pro se crisis and presenting models for court
reform); Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L.
REV. 1227 (2010) (arguing the civil Gideon movement is misguided and proposing pro se
court reform, including an active role for judges, as a better solution); Benjamin H. Barton
& Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 967, 985 (2012) (arguing for pro se court reform, including judicial assistance,
rather than civil Gideon); Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999) (call-
ing for pro se court reform and active judging and providing comprehensive analyses of
ethical and practical issues); Engler, supra note 1, at 83; Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se
Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM.
CT. REV. 36 (2002) (discussing judicial resistance to assistance for pro se litigants and
asserting judicial obligations to provide assistance);  Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Judicial Abdication
and Equal Access to the Civil Justice System, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 325 (2010) (charging
judges with the responsibility to modify rigid roles); Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality
in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the
Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969 (2004); Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Hap-
pened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869 (2009) (asserting that closing the justice
gap calls for concerted efforts from all stakeholders, including courts, and calling for pro
se court reform); Jeffrey Selbin et al., Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice:
Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45, 60–61 (2012)
(noting self-help reforms and court simplification efforts have “become significant features
of the access-to-justice landscape in their own right”); Steinberg, supra note 1 (setting out a
vision for “demand side” reform in the lower courts); Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between
the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality when Parties
Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
423 (2004) (arguing judicial assistance to pro se parties is consistent with impartiality and
fairness). But see Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms
of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537 (2005) (arguing
against pro se assistance); Frank V. Williams, III, Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiers of Judi-
cial Activism in the State Courts, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 591 (2007) (connecting the move
toward active judging with judicial activism).
6 A few language notes: I use the term “active judging” as an umbrella term to identify
models of judging that involve judges intervening in some way to assist parties in pro se
litigation.  I use the terms “intervention” and “practice” to identify particular things that
judges do when they interact with pro se parties.  Finally, I use the terms “pro se,” “self-
represented,” and “unrepresented” interchangeably throughout this Article.  In this piece,
the term “pro se” appears often for a purely functional reason: it takes up less space on the
page.  That said, I recognize many access to justice reformers prefer the term “self-repre-
sented litigant” over the more legalistic “pro se” and the lawyer centric “unrepresented.”
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document.  A traditional, passive judge might refuse to admit the evidence.
In contrast, an active judge might explain the concept of foundation and ask
a series of questions to help the pro se litigant lay the proper foundation.
Today, at a moment when calls for active judging are on the rise, it is
apparent that our thinking on judicial role reform is still in a nascent stage.
Important questions about implementation and effectiveness remain unan-
swered.  Answering these questions requires both theory and empirical data.
Currently, we have some of the former but little of the latter.
Despite significant literature that critiques the traditional, passive judi-
cial role in pro se litigation and makes the case for active judging, few empiri-
cal studies have examined how judges think about their role in pro se cases,
to what extent they are implementing active judging, and the nature of their
practices.7  In fact, we lack basic information about state courts and judges as
a general matter.8  The work of lower court civil judges in the United States is
under-researched and under-theorized compared to the vast academic litera-
7 For previous studies of judicial engagement with pro se parties, see generally GOLD-
SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 5, at 54 (reporting the results of a survey of judges where many
judges reported that personal choices guided their approach to pro se ligation); Baldacci,
supra note 5; Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor
Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992) (empirical study of a Balti-
more housing court); Michele Cotton, A Case Study on Access to Justice and How to Improve It,
16 J.L. SOCIETY 61 (2014) (study examining the experiences of unrepresented tenants in a
landlord/tenant court); Shannon Portillo, The Adversarial Process of Administrative Claims:
The Process of Unemployment Insurance Hearings, 49 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 257, 257–58 (2014) (soci-
ological study of the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings); Jessica K.
Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look at a Problem-Solving Housing
Court, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1058 (2017) (reporting observational findings from approxi-
mately 300 hearings and review of approximately seventy-five cases regarding active judg-
ing practices in a housing court described as “problem-solving”).
8 See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, Courting Ignorance: Why We Know So Little About Our
Most Important Courts, 143 DAEDALUS 130 (2014) (outlining the lack of research on state
courts). Though legal academia has paid scant attention to the work of lower courts and
lower court judges, there are notable exceptions, including those listed in note 7 and Anna R
E. Carpenter et al., Trial and Error: Lawyers and Nonlawyer Advocates, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
1023 (2017); Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897 (2013)
[hereinafter Leib, Localist] (exploring how local judges interpret the law); Ethan J. Leib,
Local Judges and Local Government, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 707 (2015) (exploring
how local judges view themselves and their crosscutting roles in local and state govern-
ment); Sandefur, supra note 4; Shanahan et al., supra note 3; Steinberg, supra note 1; Mary
Spector & Ann Baddour, Collection Texas-Style: An Analysis of Consumer Collection Practices in
and out of the Courts, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1427 (2016).  Following widespread establishment of
small claims courts in the 1960s and 70s, there was a burst of academic interest in such
courts. See, e.g., JOHN C. RUHNKA ET AL., SMALL CLAIMS COURTS: A NATIONAL EXAMINATION
(1978); Arthur Best et al., Peace, Wealth, Happiness, and Small Claim Courts: A Case Study, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 346 (1994) (noting the burst of activity around small claims courts
a few decades ago); William G. Haemmel, The North Carolina Small Claims Court—An Empiri-
cal Study, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 503 (1973); Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute Processing:
Litigation in Small Claims Court, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 339 (1976); Eric H. Steele, The Histori-
cal Context of Small Claims Courts, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 293 (offering a history of the
development of small claims courts).
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ture on judges and judging in the federal and appellate courts.9  We have
robust empirical studies and theories to describe and explain the judicial role
in complex and appellate litigation, but little comparable scholarship on
lower court judges, let alone how they handle pro se litigation.10  This gap is
striking, considering that the overwhelming majority of Americans who
access the civil justice system will never interact with a federal or appellate
9 See Michele Cotton, When Judges Don’t Follow the Law: Research and Recommendations,
19 CUNY L. REV. 57, 57–58 (2015) (discussing the lack of attention to lower courts in legal
scholarship); Leib, Localist, supra note 8, at 898–99 (noting that legal scholars have almost
universally ignored local courts, favoring the study of federal courts and state appellate
courts); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831,
836 n.17 (2008) (noting that most empirical legal scholarship in the new legal realism has
focused on federal court decisions and that state courts are a “fertile place for study”).  For
examples of legal scholarship on judges and the federal courts, see LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY
A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (2005) (analyzing
judicial decisions to determine the relationship between presidential ideology and
appointee voting records); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A
Window into the Behavior of Judges?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 87 (2008) (examining evidence of bias
in judicial citations in federal court opinions); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on
Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003) (arguing that collegiality plays an
important role in judicial decisionmaking); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul of
Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491
(2004) (examining religious freedom cases to determine the variables that affect out-
comes, including the religious beliefs of judges); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Essay, Ideological
Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004)
(examining the role of ideology in federal court of appeals voting patterns).
10 Legal academia’s focus on federal and appellate courts is likely driven by a number
of factors, not all of which are based in principle.  As a matter of principle, the study of
higher courts is obviously vital, as they offer the final word on matters of doctrine, decide
the most complex cases, and issue holdings with the potential to affect many people.  This
reality alone justifies a concerted effort to understand these courts and the judges who
preside in them, but it does not justify a near-complete focus on such courts to the exclu-
sion of the courts that mete out the vast majority of American justice.  There are many
barriers to the study of local courts.  The work of local courts is transsubstantive, cutting
across many areas of law, which is a mismatch given the subject-matter-specific focus of
much legal scholarship. See Leib, Localist, supra note 8, at 905.  We also tend to write about
what we know.  Most legal academics have little to no experience with local courts, having
served as large law firm associates and federal or appellate court clerks.  Finally, studying
local courts is a time consuming and often frustrating endeavor, whether one is interested
in quantitative data, qualitative data, or both.  To name a few issues that complicate the
study of local courts, many case types do not involve written final orders, and where written
final orders do exist, they are difficult to obtain.  Each state has a different case manage-
ment and data collection system, many of which are shockingly unsophisticated.  Thus,
obtaining data typically involves creating data sets from whole cloth, a massive undertak-
ing. See id. at 907–08 (noting the difficulty inherent in collecting data from state courts).
Power, class, and race are an important part of the picture as well.  The lower courts are
“the poor people’s court[s].” See Steinberg, supra note 1, at 741. Lower court cases, other
than criminal matters, are rarely fodder for news coverage or public protest.  The work of
these courts is largely obscured from public view.
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judge.11  In fact, our state courts, where most parties have no counsel, handle
nearly 99% of all civil matters filed in the United States each year.12  In the
absence of data about civil justice in the lower courts, our normative views
and prescriptions for change are inevitably incomplete.13
In response to the need for data, as well as theoretical and conceptual
development, this Article reports results from a study of a majority pro se
court where controlling law supports active judging.14  Using qualitative data
from in-depth interviews with twelve judges, the study offers new and much-
needed data on the real-world practices of lower court judges and a new con-
ceptual framework for understanding judicial practices in pro se litigation.
This study focuses on the point in a civil case when pro se parties interact
directly with judges: the courtroom during a civil hearing.15  It explores
whether, how, and why judges use active practices in the courtroom and dis-
cusses what the findings suggest for the future of judicial role reform and
court reform more broadly.  This work responds to questions about the scope
11 See Jessica K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role Confusion in “Small
Case” Civil Justice, 2016 BYU L. REV. 899, 919 n.94 (noting that 22.1 million civil cases were
filed in state courts in 2013, but only 271,950 were filed in the federal courts the same
year).  The lack of empirical information about our civil justice system has bedeviled many
areas of law and legal scholarship and harms our ability to make policy choices about
organization of the legal system. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on
AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 158
(2011) (noting the lack of empirical data to support judicial decisionmaking about the
effects of given procedures in a civil justice context: “While one can state the equation, one
cannot do the math because the data are missing.  Interpretative choices abound.”).  Gil-
lian Hadfield describes the lack of information about the U.S. legal market, in particular
the market for legal services for nonpoor and noncorporate clients, the organized bar’s
failure to gather such information, and the consequences of this lack of information. See
generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the
Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129 (2010).
12 See Steinberg, supra note 11, at 919 n.94.
13 See generally Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical
Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101 (setting out an expansive agenda for access to
justice research and calling for scholars to make a range of theoretical and empirical con-
tributions to better understand the operation of the civil justice system, including how
everyday Americans experience law and the justice system).
14 See infra subsections II.A.2–3 for information about District of Columbia unemploy-
ment law and judicial ethics.
15 One strength of this study is that the cases do not settle and must end in a hearing,
which provides a focus on the judge’s role in a civil hearing.  In unemployment appeals,
the outcomes are binary (benefits granted versus benefits denied), and the litigating par-
ties present and dispute the facts and the law but do not have the power to negotiate a
middle-ground outcome.  Thus, through these cases, we can understand the role of judges
without the complication of settlement.  For more on the role of settlement in pro se
litigation, see Engler, supra note 5, at 2018–21; Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepre-
sented Litigants and the Changing Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 367,
368, 376 (2008).
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and nature of proposed changes to the judicial role and begins to fill gaps in
empirical data and theory.16
This Article is part of a broader empirical study of unemployment insur-
ance cases conducted by Colleen Shanahan, Alyx Mark, and me.  The study
includes one of the broadest and deepest data sets ever collected in a U.S.
civil justice setting, with 5,150 individual case observations, qualitative inter-
views with representatives practicing in the court, and qualitative interviews
with judges.17  In previous articles, my coresearchers and I used this data to
examine the role of representatives in access to justice including the balance
of power between parties to a case,18 the role of a lawyer’s strategic exper-
tise,19 the development and exercise of expertise by nonlawyer advocates,20
and the risks of less-than-full representation.21  In a forthcoming article, Pro-
fessor Shanahan examines how parties actually gain access to the hearing
room and how judges interact with procedural rules to block or grant access
16 Empiricism in legal scholarship has been on the rise for years, and recently scholars
have begun to call for, and engage in, research that sheds light on the operation of our
lower courts and the civil justice system in the lives of everyday people.  Support for this
work can be seen in the area of access to justice scholarship.  See generally Albiston &
Sandefur, supra note 13.  It can also be seen in the area of new legal realism.  See, e.g.,
Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword: Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335,
337 (describing “new legal realism,” a scholarly project that seeks to “bring together legal
theory and empirical research to build a stronger foundation for understanding law and
formulating legal policy”); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism:
Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 79 (2009) (map-
ping out the history of “new legal realism,” critiquing the varieties of new legal realism, and
offering a new framework for future scholarly work).
17 The broader study does not consider a sample of cases, but rather every unemploy-
ment appeal case filed in the court over a two-and-a-half-year period. See Shanahan et al.,
supra note 3, at 518 & n.109.  For other recent studies, see, for example, Ingrid V. Eagly &
Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(2015); D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal
Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118
(2012); Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 295 (2007).  For an earlier, seminal, mixed-methods study of an unemployment
court, see HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK
(1998).
18 See Shanahan et al., supra note 3, at 484–89.
19 Id. at 471, 489–505.
20 Carpenter et al., supra note 8 (using an empirical study of lawyers and nonlawyer
advocates, the authors found that judges play a critical role in shaping nonlawyer legal
expertise and nonlawyers develop expertise almost exclusively through “trial and error”;
the authors found that, while experienced nonlawyers can help parties through their
expertise with common court procedures and basic substantive legal concepts, they are not
equipped to challenge judges on contested issues of substantive or procedural law in indi-
vidual cases, advance novel legal claims, or advocate for law reform on a broader scale).
21 Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Can a Little Representation Be
a Dangerous Thing?, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1367 (2016) (arguing that access to justice interven-
tions involving less-than-full legal representation have risks, including the risk that individ-
ual clients will not have the benefit of meaningful legal challenges in their own cases, while
the larger legal system loses opportunities for systemic law reform).
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for unrepresented parties.22  Her work examines the judge’s role in access to
justice outside of the courtroom, while this Article looks at the judge’s role
inside the courtroom.  Taken together, these articles contribute to a deeper
understanding of the judge’s role in pro se litigation and the potential for
court-based access to justice reforms.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I contextualizes the study by
explaining how active judging became part of the conversation about civil
justice system reform, including the backdrop of the pro se crisis, how the
traditional, passive approach to judging exacerbates challenges facing those
without counsel, and recent shifts in judicial ethics in response to the rise of
pro se litigation.
Part I also reviews existing scholarship on judicial practices in pro se
cases and offers a new conceptual framework to organize proposals for judi-
cial role reform, the “three dimensions of active judging.”  These dimensions
include: (1) adjusting procedures; (2) explaining law and process; and (3)
eliciting information.  Next, Part I identifies expectations for the qualitative
interviews based on existing research, which predicts substantial variations in
practice across the judges.  Previous research also suggests this study can con-
tribute to our understanding of active judging as an access to justice interven-
tion by identifying how a particular group of judges thinks about their role in
pro se cases, whether and how they are implementing active judging, and the
factors that influence and mediate active judging.  To answer the questions
identified in Part I, this Article draws on semistructured qualitative interviews
with judges who preside over predominantly pro se unemployment insurance
appeals dockets.
Part II describes the site of the study, the District of Columbia Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH); the study subjects, OAH judges; and the
study’s methodological approach.  This Part details the substantive law of
unemployment appeals, as this information is critical in understanding the
active judging practices employed by judges in this court.  It also describes
controlling law on judicial engagement with pro se parties and judicial ethics
in the District of Columbia, both of which support active judging and provide
more detailed guidance than is available in most other jurisdictions.
Part III presents and discusses the findings, which are organized into
three categories: (1) whether the judges engage in active judging; (2) varia-
tions in active judging practices; and (3) sources of guidance that influence
active judging in the court.
First, the findings show a group of judges who see themselves as playing
a role in facilitating fairness and access for pro se parties.  For all of the
judges interviewed, this involves some form of active judging.
Second, while a commitment to assisting pro se litigants through some
form of active judging is shared by all judges, individual judges’ views and
practices vary across three dimensions of active judging.  This result aligns
22 Colleen F. Shanahan, Keys to the Kingdom: Judges and Pre-Hearing Procedure in Access to
Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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with previous research, which suggests judges have inconsistent and ad hoc
approaches to dealing with pro se parties.  Looking at the three dimensions
of active judging, we see that all judges interviewed are willing to adjust pro-
cedures to accommodate pro se litigants, but in the other two dimensions—
explaining law and process and eliciting information—judges’ practices vary.
The variations are shaped by individual judges’ senses of what is fair and
appropriate in pro se matters, and importantly, by controlling appellate
decisions.
The findings of this study suggest there is no single model of, or
approach to, active judging.  The study shows that active judging, at least in
this court, cannot be conceptualized by a single spectrum of active to passive
practices.  Instead, active judging in this court is best viewed as multidimen-
sional.  The findings also suggest that the existing literature has paid insuffi-
cient attention to judicial interactions with defendants as opposed to
plaintiffs.  This is particularly important given that we now know the vast
majority of unrepresented parties in nonfamily state civil court matters are
defendants.23
Third, the variations in active judging persist in this court despite the
fact that the judges share sources of guidance about active judging.  These
sources, identified by the judges, are the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, Department of Labor guidelines (the agency regulates the unem-
ployment appeals system), and other judges on the court, through a peer
review process.  The findings make clear that judges’ views and practices
evolved over time and these three sources of guidance have played a critical
role in that evolution.  Finally, the findings highlight how individual judges
are left to make their own decisions about handling pro se cases even in a
court where guidance is substantial compared to other jurisdictions.  Consis-
tency in active judging may be elusive and may require more or different
guidance than that offered to judges in this court.
Part IV presents some implications of this study for civil justice policy
and future research.  Drawing on the findings, this Part suggests the need for
a context-based analysis of the role of substantive law and the burden of
proof in active judging and pro se litigation.  It then identifies questions
related to the interaction of procedural rules, unrepresented parties, and
judging, and asks whether we are willing to formalize a two-tier system of
justice: one for those who have counsel and one for those who do not.
Finally, it raises issues of consistency and accountability for judges in majority
pro se courts and asks how we should strike the balance between judicial
independence and consistency in active judging practices.
In this Article, my intent is to present and analyze data about a group of
judges working in a lower civil court and, based on that data, to offer theory
and raise questions about the operation of our lower courts and the future of
civil justice reform efforts.  Many more are needed to develop a full picture
of justice in our state civil courts and to understand the reforms and interven-
23 See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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tions that might improve them.  Of course, given the depth and severity of
the problems facing the civil justice system, we also need experimentation
and creativity.  Going forward, I hope legal scholars will engage in both types
of work.
I. CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
This study exists in the context of an ongoing conversation about the
role of judges in the new pro se reality.  To date, legal scholars writing about
access to the civil justice system have focused on whether active judging is an
appropriate access to justice intervention and have largely answered this
question in the affirmative.24  If we have decided, as it appears we have, that
active judging is appropriate, then the value of this study lies in beginning to
answer whether active judging is happening and why, what it looks like in
practice, and how judges themselves understand it.
Before examining these questions, we should understand how active
judging became an important topic in conversations about civil justice
reform.  To that end, this Part outlines the practical challenges pro se parties
face in adversarial civil litigation and how the traditional judicial role—one
shaped by the values of passivity and neutrality—contributes to those chal-
lenges.  Next, it reviews proposals for reform of the judge’s role and concep-
tually organizes these proposals into three dimensions of active judging: (1)
adjusting procedures; (2) explaining law and process; and (3) eliciting infor-
mation.  Later, the Article uses this framework to analyze the qualitative data.
Although previous studies of lower court judges are limited, this Part also
reviews and discusses what the existing literature suggests about expectations
for the qualitative interviews.
A. Unrepresented Parties and the Traditional Civil Justice System
America’s lower courts are in the fourth decade of what most observers
have described as a crisis.25  Today, a majority of parties in these courts have
no legal representation in civil matters.26  The highest rates of self-represen-
tation overall are in cases that implicate basic human needs, such as health,
family relations, safety, housing, and income security.27  In cases related to
24 See supra note 5.
25 In addition to the crisis at the courthouse, socio-legal scholars have pointed out that
most Americans never take their civil legal problems to a court or lawyer for assistance.
Thus, there is much more “need” for civil legal services than is visible in our nation’s
courtrooms.  For more discussion on this point, see infra notes 39–41 and accompanying
text.
26 Reviewing the research as of 2015, Jessica Steinberg found that “[w]hile a definitive
national picture on pro se litigation is lacking, it is not improbable to estimate that two-
thirds of all cases in American civil trial courts involve at least one unrepresented individ-
ual.  In short, the magnitude of the pro se crisis is immense.”  Steinberg, supra note 1, at
751.
27 See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1227, 1231 (2014).
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family issues, such as divorce, custody, and domestic violence, both parties
are often unrepresented.28  In nonfamily cases, such as contract and tort mat-
ters, one-sided representation is the norm, with a recent nationally represen-
tative study finding 76% of all nonfamily civil cases involve one party without
counsel, almost always the defendant.29
In response, access to justice reformers argue that the civil justice system
itself must change to confront the new pro se reality.  Central to this vision is
an active judge, one who maintains impartiality while promoting access and
fairness for pro se parties by making procedural adjustments, explaining law
and the hearing process, and eliciting information to develop the record.  To
understand the current interest in active judging it is first necessary to under-
stand how the traditional civil legal system operates and how this system
works against pro se parties.
The American civil justice system is adversarial.  The impartial judge,
whose neutrality is both facilitated and signaled by passivity, sits at the center
of this system.  The parties, via their skilled advocates, must drive all aspects
of litigation.  From the inception of a claim to the process of a hearing or
trial, parties are expected to identify claims and defenses, develop and pre-
sent evidence, employ procedural rules, and formulate legal arguments.30
In party-driven litigation, the judge is like an umpire.  She may respond
to pleadings, objections, motions, and arguments by the parties, but should
generally not raise substantive or procedural issues sua sponte.31  She must
decide cases based only on the facts presented by the parties, but play no role
in eliciting facts.32  Her primary objective is to ensure a level playing field
upon which the skilled advocates battle.
Most pro se parties are simply unequipped to advance their own inter-
ests in party-driven litigation.  Accounts of their failures abound.33  Pro se
parties do not know or understand substantive law or procedural rules.  They
struggle to complete or file basic documents.  They cannot complete essen-
tial procedural tasks such as serving process on the opposing party.  They do
not appreciate the formal processes or informal norms of courts.  They are
28 See Steinberg, supra note 1, at 743.
29 See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 3.
30 See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1042–43 (1975); Norman W. Spaulding, Essay, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adver-
sary System Values, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1377, 1391 (2008); Steinberg, supra note 11, at 960;
Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 302
(1989).
31 Frankel, supra note 30, at 1042 (“The ignorance and unpreparedness of the judge
are intended axioms of the system.”).
32 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules—and the
Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191, 204 (2007).
33 See supra note 1; see also Victor D. Quintanilla et al., The Signaling Effect of Pro Se
Status, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1091, 1094 (2017); Kat Aaron, The People’s Court?, AM. PROS-
PECT (Nov. 21, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/peoples-court.
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particularly disadvantaged when they must face a skilled advocate on the
other side of the case.34
Beyond legal and procedural hurdles, basic human and emotional chal-
lenges affect pro se parties.  For the uninitiated, courts, including administra-
tive tribunals, are deeply intimidating places.35  Pro se parties experience
strong negative emotions including embarrassment and fear.36  These reac-
tions are driven not only by the formal environment of the courthouse and
complexity of the legal system, but also, and perhaps more importantly, by
the fact that so many pro se litigants are poor and find themselves facing
outcomes that could take away housing, income, or family connections.37
Many pro se parties enter the courthouse with the firm belief that the system
is rigged and unfair, and that they have lost before the case has even
begun.38
34 See Shanahan et al., supra note 3, at 484–89.
35 Barbara Bezdek’s study of tenants in a housing court highlights the psychological
effects of being effectively “silenced” by judges.  For example, she observes that “the rule-
oriented court talk expected and privileged by judges in low-level courts bears little or no
relation to people_fs natural narratives. . . . For most tenants, such a court offers a stern
lesson that formal rights are for somebody else and not for them.”  Bezdek, supra note 7, at
588–89.  The findings of a recent sociological study bring the emotional effects of a court
appearance, even in an administrative setting, into stark relief:
The words “scary,” “confusing,” and “afraid” were used consistently when respon-
dents described their experiences with administrative hearings . . . :
I walked in there and man, I was scared.  It was all formal and I felt like my
life, my earnings, were on the line.  They were not nice.  Not nice at all, in
fact.  I honestly found it very confusing.
—Tonya
Not many things make me afraid, but that sure did.  I remember taking the
train over there, and my stomach hurt.  Had no idea what to expect.  I knew
it would be bad.  And it was.  Confusing right from the get go about where to
go, and only got worse.  I had to wait, wait, wait, and then it was over in a jiffy.
No chance to even talk.  Wouldn_ft want to do that again.
—Monique
. . . .
Fear.  Honest to goodness fear.  That_fs how I felt.  Fear of what would hap-
pen.  What they would say.  They were tearing apart my life and I wasn_ft
even allowed to talk.  To defend myself.  Honey, let me tell you, it was no fun.
Keep me away from all of that.  Keep me away.
—Mya
Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1263,
1296–97 (2016).
36 Id.
37 See sources cited supra note 1.  Litigants who are immigrants face additional chal-
lenges, such as language barriers, cultural differences, and fears of deportation. See Mac-
Dowell, supra note 1, at 535.
38 See Greene, supra note 35, at 1266–68, 1276, 1307.
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Though a full and nuanced discussion of the troubles facing the civil
justice system is beyond the scope of this Article, even a summary discussion
of our justice system must acknowledge that access to justice issues do not
begin or end at the courthouse doors or in a lawyer’s office.  Although civil
justice problems—problems that can be addressed by the legal system—are
common, most Americans never take their civil justice problems to a lawyer
or a court.  In fact, almost half of the time people respond to civil justice
problems by doing nothing at all.  A recent national survey of legal needs
found that only a quarter of civil legal problems were ever taken to a lawyer,
while only fourteen percent were ever taken to a court.39  Responding to a
civil legal problem by doing nothing is more common among low-income
people and may be even more common among low-income African Ameri-
cans.40  For the first time, new research shows how individuals’ negative per-
ceptions and past experiences with the criminal justice system influence their
views about the civil justice system.41  In the face of such widespread lack of
engagement in, and dissatisfaction with, the civil justice system, our court-
houses are nonetheless filled to the brim with unrepresented parties.  Thus,
access to justice problems are deeper, more complex, and more nuanced
than even the pro se crisis in our courts (a dire problem in its own right)
suggests.
B. Why Not Increase Services?
An obvious first question is why judges and courts should be involved at
all in solving the pro se problem.  If litigants lack representation, why not
simply provide more lawyers?  From the early days of the pro se crisis, poli-
cymaking, scholarship, and advocacy have focused on increasing the supply
of free and low-cost civil legal services, particularly access to lawyers.  For
decades, advocates have called for and worked to support policy, funding,
and doctrinal reform to increase the supply of lawyers in civil matters involv-
ing basic needs.42  In market-based language, such “supply-side” interven-
tions, whether in the form of lawyers, nonlawyer advocates, technology, or
self-help services, seek to provide more and better legal services to ensure
39 See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 51, 60 (2010).  There are many reasons to believe that the actual
number of civil justice problems facing the American public is much larger than existing
surveys suggest. Id. at 57.
40 Greene, supra note 35, at 1301–13; Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing
Nothing: Everyday Problems and Responses of Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL
PROCESS 116 (Pasco Pleasence et al. eds., 2007).
41 Greene, supra note 35, at 1263, 1267 (“For most respondents, the criminal and civil
justice systems are one and the same, and injustices they perceive in the criminal system
translate into their belief that the justice system as a whole is unjust.”).
42 This movement is often called “Civil Gideon,” a name meant to invoke the constitu-
tional right to counsel in criminal matters. See Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases: Lessons from Gideon v. Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 527 (2006) (articu-
lating the challenges of universal representation in the criminal context and identifying
lessons for the civil right to counsel movement).
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that individuals who must go to court do not face the complexity of civil
litigation without assistance or advocacy.43
Unfortunately, efforts to increase the supply of lawyers and other legal
services have not succeeded and are not likely to succeed in closing the “jus-
tice gap.”44  As Gillian Hadfield has argued, given the extent of the demand
for legal services in the United States, increases in civil legal aid funding can-
not possibly meet the need.45  On top of the economic barriers, efforts to
secure a limited right to counsel in civil cases have also failed as a doctrinal
matter.46  In light of existing fiscal and political challenges, it is unlikely that
funding for civil legal services will increase anytime soon.
C. Move Toward Judicial Reform
Given the failure (and arguable futility) of a single-minded focus on
traditional supply-side remedies, a growing chorus of diverse voices in legal
academia, policy circles, and the civil justice system are calling for judicial
role reform in response to the pro se crisis.47  Reform proposals seek to
improve the extent to which cases involving pro se parties have objectively
just outcomes and fair processes, with judges playing a critical role.  Rather
than defaulting to the passive umpire role and thus allowing pro se parties to
flounder, reforms would see judges taking affirmative steps to help pro se
parties navigate the civil litigation process.  Reformers argue judges can assist
43 For a discussion of supply-side issues in access to justice research and legal services
delivery, see Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 13, at 114–16.
44 See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2007); Norah Rexer, Note, A Profes-
sional Responsibility: The Role of Lawyers in Closing the Justice Gap, 22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 585, 585 (2015) (noting that while “there is one attorney for every 429 people living
above the poverty line,” “only one legal aid attorney” is available for “every 6415 individuals
living in poverty,” causing underfunded legal aid programs to turn away persons in need of
legal assistance on a daily basis).
45 See Hadfield, supra note 11, at 152 (making an economic argument that increases in R
funding for civil legal services cannot possibly meet the need for those services given the
extent of the need, and finding even a twentyfold increase in funding would only amount
to an hour of additional legal services per household).
46 See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
47 Another response is to argue, as Deborah Rhode has done most prominently, for
expanded roles for nonlawyers to provide civil legal services. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE,
ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING
THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000); Rhode, supra note 27; Deborah L. Rhode, Essay, Professional-
ism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 701 (1996); see also Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to
Lawyers, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287 (2013); Hadfield, supra note 11, at 153–54.  For R
empirical explorations of nonlawyer practice, see generally KRITZER, supra note 17; Carpen-
ter et al., supra note 8; Sandefur, supra note 4.  For a discussion of the risks and benefits of R
nonlawyer representation and potential for triage in nonlawyer practice, see generally
Shanahan et al., supra note 21. For arguments in favor of court-based reform and judicial
role reform, see supra note 5. R
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pro se parties while maintaining the traditional judicial values of impartiality
and neutrality.48
One argument in support of judicial role reform is purely practical: the
judge is often the only person physically present in the courtroom who has
the expertise and ability to help those without counsel.49  Though other
forms of assistance—such as self-help services, limited scope representation,
and nonlawyer services—may be available outside the courtroom, within the
courtroom the only source of legal expertise is typically the judge.  In this
way, proposals for judicial role reform appear to be driven less by normative
ideas about effectiveness and more by necessity.50  Efficiency is also a factor,
given that one judge can help many unrepresented parties without the need
for additional personnel.51
Yet another argument is about effectiveness.  Ben Barton has made a
strong case against the quest for a civil right to counsel, arguing it would be
subject to the same failures we see in the criminal justice system and that
changes to the judicial role and other court-based reforms would be more
effective in providing meaningful assistance to pro se parties.52  Another
important focus of the court and judicial reform literature is the argument
that traditional judicial passivity, as a matter of ethics, is not neutral as
applied to pro se parties, but is instead affirmatively harmful.53
While the active judicial role is widely understood to be a recent devel-
opment in the context of the pro se crisis, Jessica Steinberg has pointed out
that it is not new in the broader civil justice context.54  As Judith Resnik
famously articulated more than thirty years ago, judges handling complex
and multiparty cases routinely take on a “managerial” role in the pretrial
phases of litigation, while in public law matters judges exert significant con-
trol over post-trial remedy enforcement.55  Steinberg shows how the active
judge has long played a role in complex and public law litigation and draws
connections between active judging in complex litigation and small, state
48 See, e.g., Engler, supra note 15, at 385.
49 See Shanahan et al., supra note 3, at 507–12 (discussing the role of lawyer expertise R
in the civil justice system and a new theory of lawyer’s strategic expertise).
50 Inevitably, proposals for judicial role reform are not based on empirical arguments
about efficacy, as we lack data on the effectiveness of judicial interventions in pro se cases.
As this Article illustrates, we lack clarity and consensus about the questions we should be
asking.
51 See, e.g., Barton, supra note 5, at 1273. R
52 See id.
53 See ZORZA, supra note 5, at 18; Engler, supra note 15, at 371–79; Goldschmidt, supra
note 5, at 37, 48–51; Steinberg, supra note 11, at 899; Steinberg, supra note 1, at 755–56; R
Sward, supra note 30, at 321 n.96.
54 See generally Steinberg, supra note 11. R
55 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (arguing against
the rise of managerial judging). But see Paul R.J. Connolly, Why We Do Need Managerial
Judges, 23 JUDGES’ J. 34 (1984) (arguing in favor of managerial judging). See generally
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976)
(describing the rise of public law litigation in the federal courts and the role of judges in
this context).
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court matters.  She argues that active judging in both contexts is justified
insofar as it is needed to manage complexity and the realities of civil litiga-
tion.  In big cases, active judging is needed to manage the maze of pre- and
post-trial procedural issues, extended discovery, and the enforcement of rem-
edies.  In small state court matters, active judging addresses the challenge of
developing factual and legal issues in a case in the absence of counsel.56  Of
course, there are critical differences between big, complex matters and
smaller, lower court matters, as Steinberg acknowledges.57  Most importantly,
in complex litigation, attorney representation for both sides is the norm—a
check on judicial behavior that simply does not exist in most state court
litigation.58
Today, it appears arguments in favor of active judging are having some
effect on policy and practice.  An official policy shift, albeit tentative in some
quarters, is visible in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, state judicial ethics
codes, Supreme Court and other appellate court decisions, and judicial liter-
ature.59  Others scholars have given these developments a thorough treat-
ment and I will review them only briefly here.  The important point is this:
while some authorities have taken a permissive stance on active judging,
there is little in the way of specific guidance on the scope, nature, and objec-
56 See Steinberg, supra note 11, at 906. R
57 Id. at 955.
58 Even in the complex litigation context, with skilled lawyers on either side, scholars
have roundly criticized the existing managerial judging regime in complex litigation on
matters of transparency and accountability. See, e.g., Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural
Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41 (1995).  As
the Federal Courts Study Committee has stated:
There are no standards for making these “managerial” decisions, the judge is not
required to provide a “reasoned justification,” and there is no appellate review.
Each judge is free to consult his or her own conception of the importance and
merit of a case and the proper speed with which it should be disposed.  This, in
turn, promotes arbitrariness.
1 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 55 (1990) (cit-
ing E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
306, 311 (1986)); see also Resnik, supra note 55, at 378, 426.
59 Signs of the shift toward active judging include changes in judicial ethics, see MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 R. 2.2 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007, amended 2010),
the adoption of revised Rule 2.2 verbatim or with minor variations by fourteen states as of
2014, see Cynthia Gray, Pro Se Litigants in the Code of Judicial Conduct, NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS.
JUD. ETHICS & DISCIPLINE BLOG (Nov. 25, 2014), https://ncscjudicialethicsblog.org/2014/
11/25/pro-se-litigants-in-the-code-of-judicial-conduct/, and the Supreme Court’s decision
in Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011)—though the effects of Turner are debated.  Some
scholars have read the case negatively in terms of its potential impact on access to justice,
see, e.g., Laura K. Abel, Turner v. Rogers and the Right of Meaningful Access to the Courts, 89
DENV. U. L. REV. 805 (2012), while others have found, at a minimum, the hope for positive
effects in the future, see, e.g., Russell Engler, Turner v. Rogers and the Essential Role of the
Courts in Delivering Access to Justice, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31 (2013).  Many articles pub-
lished in law reviews and judicial publications over the past two decades have also pro-
moted active judging. See supra note 5.  For a full review of developments pre-2012, see R
generally Engler, supra note 15.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 18 28-DEC-17 10:22
664 notre dame law review [vol. 93:2
tives of a judge’s role in pro se litigation.60  Individual judges are left to craft
their own approaches, and the limited evidence available suggests they do
just that.61
A recent critical change was the American Bar Association’s (ABA) 2007
revision of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.  The ABA altered Rule 2.2,
which governs the judge’s duty of impartiality, by adding the following lan-
guage in a comment to the rule: “It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge
to make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportu-
nity to have their matters fairly heard.”62  The “reasonable accommodations”
language certainly appears to permit some level of active judging, but the
scope of what constitutes “reasonable” is undeveloped.  The ABA’s report on
the rule change provides little additional guidance.  It states, “[B]y leveling
the playing field . . . judges ensure that pro se litigants receive the fair hear-
ing to which they are entitled.  On the other hand, judges should resist
unreasonable demands for assistance that might give an unrepresented party
an unfair advantage.”63  The ABA does not further define what might consti-
tute an unfair advantage or an unreasonable demand.  Thus, individual
judges are still left to interpret and apply the vague reasonable accommoda-
tions standard.
Unfortunately, looking to appellate caselaw provides little additional gui-
dance on the permissible scope of judicial activity.  Scholars who have
engaged in comprehensive reviews of appellate caselaw share common con-
clusions.  First, the number of decisions that speak to a judge’s role in pro se
litigation is small.64  Second, the guidance that does exist is contradictory
and vague.65  Third, few cases speak with any specificity about the concrete,
day-to-day tasks that comprise a judge’s work.66
60 See GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 5, at 55–57; Albrecht et al., supra note 5, at R
43–45; Baldacci, supra note 5, at 665; Engler, supra note 15, at 370; Engler, supra note 5, at R
2043; Pearce, supra note 5, at 978; Steinberg, supra note 11, at 926–31. R
61 See GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 5, at 54; Steinberg, supra note 11, at 937–38, R
946.
62 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 R. 2.2 cmt. 4.
63 AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA JOINT COMMISSION TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT 47 (2005), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
judicialethics/house_report.authcheckdam.pdf.
64 For the most recent analysis of appellate caselaw related to pro se litigation and
judicial engagement, see Steinberg, supra note 11, at 927–31; see also Engler, supra note 15, R
at 370–71; Engler, supra note 5, at 2012. R
65 See supra note 64.
66 Many cases exhort judges not to assist pro se parties and to treat them the same as
represented parties. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 11, at 927 (citing Fitzgerald v. Fitzger-
ald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), as “an example of the courts’ emphasis on
the norm of party control,” wherein parties are expected to act like lawyers); id. (citing
Waushara Cty. v. Graf, 480 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Wis. 1992), wherein the court emphasized that a
trial judge has no duty to “walk pro se litigants through the procedural requirements or to
point them to the proper substantive law”); id. at 929 n.136 (citing Jacobsen v. Filler, 790
F.2d 1362, 1366–67 (9th Cir. 1986), in which the Ninth Circuit determined judges could
decline to instruct pro se litigants on rules of procedure); id. at 933 (citing Bauman v.
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On the ground, while many judges likely hew to the passive norm, lim-
ited evidence suggests some judges are beginning to alter their practices in
response to the rise of pro se litigation.67  However, given the paucity of offi-
cial guidance and lack of consensus on the permissible scope and nature of
active judging practices, judges are forced to make individual choices about
how to respond to pro se litigants.68  At least one scholar has argued that
judges’ individual “departures” from adversary procedure are not only wide-
spread, but dangerous, given the inevitable inconsistency in results.69
The notion that individual judges are engaging in varied and ad hoc
active judging practices is consistent with existing empirical and anecdotal
information about state court judges.  In fact, inconsistency across judges is a
major theme in previous studies of lower courts.  Studies have found substan-
tial variation in decisionmaking, judicial style, and adherence to the rule of
law across individual judges in the same court, even those who work in the
same areas of law.  These inconsistencies across judges have been identified
in many different civil law settings, from small claims courts to general civil
dockets and administrative fora.70  Such findings appear in a 1998 study of a
lower civil court, which noted that “judges vary so much with respect to their
views of the law, their manner of dispensing justice, and the remedies they
provide that it becomes difficult to appreciate that they are operating within
the same legal system.”71  As early as 2002, scholars documented the phe-
State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 768 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Alaska 1989), as an example of a
case in which a court concluded a judge had no duty to provide explanation to an unrepre-
sented individual who had “failed to make at least a defective attempt to comply with pro-
cedure”).  Others permit or require assistance to pro se parties.  For examples of cases
permitting, but not requiring, judicial assistance, see id. at 929 (citing Austin v. Ellis, 408
A.2d 784 (N.H. 1979), a case in which the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted judges
do have a duty to underrepresented parties but failed to prescribe a specific formula for
judges to use in determining what the duty requires); id. at 930 (citing Nelson v. Jacobsen,
669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), to illustrate a case in which the court first indicated its desire
for judges to “strike an active stance” with pro se parties, but later “backpedaled” its posi-
tion, “caution[ing] that a judge is not required to ‘translate legal terms, explain legal rules,
or otherwise attempt to redress the ongoing consequences of the party’s’ pro se status”
(quoting Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1213)) Decisions appear to lack coherent principles.  Engler
argues appellate case outcomes “may be driven as much by the particular facts of the case
as by a given judge’s approach.”  Engler, supra note 5, at 2014. R
67 See supra note 60. R
68 See supra note 60. R
69 See Steinberg, supra note 11, at 937–43. R
70 Annie Decker, A Theory of Local Common Law, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1939, 1951 (2014)
(listing irregularities across courts in New York state, noting that a judge explained, “I just
follow my own common sense . . . . And the hell with the law.” (alteration in original)
(quoting William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of New York, Abuses of Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/nyregion/25courts.html) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
71 John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Fundamentals of Jurisprudence: An Ethnography
of Judicial Decision Making in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 467, 468 (1988) (“These diver-
gences appear not only across different cities and states, but even within [a] single court
system[ ].  When seen from this perspective, justice at this level does not comprise a single
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nomenon of judges applying inconsistent approaches in pro se litigation.72
Most recently, Jessica Steinberg drew on examples from her own field
research and that of other scholars to argue that civil judges have essentially
abandoned the passive judicial role in pro se cases and are instead engaging
in ad hoc and varied practices as they cope with the challenges of interacting
with pro se parties in the courtroom.73
Given the lack of clear or specific directives from caselaw, ethical rules,
or other official sources, and faced with the pressure of unrepresented par-
ties on their dockets, judges can take one of two general paths.  One path
involves attempting to maintain passivity and the appearance of neutrality
through nonengagement, leaving pro se parties to fend for themselves and,
most certainly, to fail to present their case or defend their interests.  The
common critique of this approach, one marshaled routinely in scholarship
arguing for active judging, calls for a decoupling of passivity and neutrality,
with the idea that maintaining passivity in the face of potential miscarriages
of justice in pro se litigation is not neutrality at all; rather, it is ultimately bias
against the unrepresented party.74
Taking the alternative path, judges can choose to engage with pro se
parties in an attempt to help those parties navigate the challenges of litiga-
tion.  Obviously, any attempt must be rooted in the principles of impartiality,
neutrality, and fairness.  Judges might use a range of strategies and practices,
such as questioning parties on factual issues, defining legal issues, raising and
sustaining objections, or effectively eliminating certain procedural rules
entirely.  Here, the details matter.  It is one thing to sign on to the broad idea
of “questioning parties” to develop the record, but the nature of that ques-
tioning, when it is done, and in what form, are complex and nuanced issues.
For example, should pro se parties have the opportunity to speak and give
narrative testimony during their case-in-chief?  Or should the judge begin by
conducting an examination?  Should the questions be open-ended, as in
direct examination, or more leading?  Are these distinctions important
process that can be described and evaluated, but rather consists of a broad range of varia-
ble processes whose specifics seem to reflect the differing outlooks and practices of individ-
ual judges.”).
72 For studies and observations about the inconsistency of judicial practice in pro se
cases, see, for example, supra note 7; see also Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of R
Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 439 (2009).
73 See Steinberg, supra note 11, at 937–43.  Steinberg draws on existing data and her R
own field research to make the case that “ad hoc” judging and departures from traditional
adversarial procedure are widespread.
Because adversary doctrine works at odds with the fundamental goal of basing
decisions on the relevant law and facts, many judges simply disregard it—and do
so completely under the radar.  The dockets in most civil courts would grind to a
halt if judges did not find ways to assist the unrepresented parties who appear
before them.
Id. at 938.
74 See, e.g., Zorza, supra note 5.
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enough to require guidance?  Or should the methods be a matter of
discretion?
In light of these critical questions, I turn to the scholarly and policy liter-
ature where we see a range of recommendations about active judging prac-
tices.  This literature helps identify expectations for the qualitative interviews
and provides a framework for analyzing the interview data.  To that end, the
following reviews active judging proposals drawn from legal scholarship and
judicial practice materials and discusses key themes on access to justice for
pro se litigants that relate to the judge’s role.
D. Three Dimensions of Active Judging
Academic and policy work on active judging offers a range of sugges-
tions and best practices for judges.  This literature attempts to flesh out, in
greater detail than we see in ethics rules and caselaw, the appropriate bounds
of judicial intervention in pro se litigation.  Despite an expansive body of
work on the topic, the literature has not moved toward a shared conceptual
framework to organize the range of possible judicial activity in pro se litiga-
tion.  In response, I have drawn the various threads of the literature together
and defined three dimensions of active judging in civil hearings and trials.
These include a judge’s role in: (1) adjusting procedures;75 (2) explaining
law and process;76 and (3) eliciting information.77  Below, I discuss each in
turn, while also identifying what the literature suggests about the qualitative
interview results.
1. Judges Adjusting Procedures
Procedural rules present a serious and often insurmountable hurdle for
pro se litigants.  In our party-driven system, most cases in the state courts
require some action on the part of litigants to move a case forward.  The
literature and caselaw are rife with examples of pro se parties failing to
understand or comply with procedures, both inside and outside the court-
room.78  In fact, a recent metastudy on the effectiveness of legal representa-
tion finds lawyers’ impact may be greatest where they help low-status parties
75 See Goldschmidt, supra note 5, at 43.
76 See Engler, supra note 5, at 2028 (proposing that the court assist the unrepresented R
litigant with procedure to be followed, presentation of evidence, and questions of law).
77 See id. (“[T]he court may call witnesses and conduct direct or cross-examinations.
The court has a ‘basic obligation to develop a full and fair record . . . .’ Each of these duties
is not only wholly consistent with the notion of impartiality, but also necessary for the
system to maintain its impartiality.” (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Lashley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th Cir. 1983))).
78 See, e.g., Rhea v. Designmark Serv., Inc., 942 A.2d 651 (D.C. 2008); Bezdek, supra
note 7; Engler, supra note 5; Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 17; Sandefur, supra note 4; R
infra note 126; see also Shanahan, supra note 22 (analyzing data regarding unrepresented R
parties’ use of pre-hearing procedures); cf. Wright-Taylor v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 974 A.2d
210, 218 (D.C. 2009) (noting, upon claimant’s denial of appeal, that “[a] person reading
this form as it now stands, perhaps short of a cautious and legally trained individual, could
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navigate procedures that are simple for lawyers, but complex for unrepre-
sented lay people.79  Here, I use the term “procedures” broadly to include
trial processes such as the order of testimony, written procedural rules, and
evidentiary rules.
Across civil cases, pro se parties are challenged by procedures in a num-
ber of common ways.  Before a party gets into the courtroom in many civil
matters, their ability to manage discovery may determine what evidence is
available or admissible.  An insufficient pleading can be grounds for dismissal
based on an oral motion by the other party.  Once they get into the court-
room, pro se parties struggle to understand and navigate the process of a
hearing and the presentation of evidence.  Where pro se litigants have the
burden of proof, they may be unable to articulate a foundation to admit key
evidence.  For defendants without the burden of proof, cross-examination is
hardly an intuitive skill. Both sides will struggle to examine witnesses, present
relevant and noncumulative testimony, and make evidentiary objections.
Advocates for reform argue that formal procedures should not be a bar-
rier to the full presentation of evidence and have proposed changes to the
traditional procedural regime in predominantly pro se courts.  There are two
schools of thought: one favors a system grounded in informality and judicial
discretion, while another takes a more formalist approach and calls for a
redesigned system of rules in pro se litigation.  Choosing between these two
visions, or finding a compromise position, is a critical project for the access to
justice movement.
The prevailing view holds that informality is the key to access and fair-
ness for pro se litigants.  Reformers who support the informal approach want
to ensure individual judges have discretion to make procedural accommoda-
tions where necessary to assist pro se parties.80  This vision is often tied to the
idea that courts of general jurisdiction should operate more like small claims
courts and administrative hearing bodies,81 which were generally designed to
have fewer procedural rules and to give judges wide discretion to conduct
trials in the manner they determine best promotes fairness and justice.82
However, it is worth noting that there is evidence of a move toward greater
formality in administrative courts over the past few decades.83  That said, we
reasonably conclude that if she took the letter personally to a U.S. Post Office for mailing
within the given time limit, she would have complied with the filing requirements”).
79 See Sandefur, supra note 4, at 917, 924. R
80 See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 5.
81 See Engler, supra note 5, at 2016–17.
82 See Best et al., supra note 8, at 372–78 (noting that most small claims courts give
judges discretion regarding the conduct of trials, and reporting the results of a study of a
small claims court where magistrates varied substantially in how they conducted trials,
including questioning witnesses, enforcing service of process requirements, and ruling on
evidence).
83 See Phyllis E. Bernard, The Administrative Law Judge as a Bridge Between Law and Cul-
ture, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 9–12, 18 (2003) (describing Social Security ALJs
behaving like civil trial judges and noting that “[i]n many agencies today, administrative
litigation is virtually indistinguishable from civil litigation”).
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lack empirical data to fully understand the levels of formality and informality
in administrative courts, not to mention whether administrative law judges
are any more adept than state court judges in dealing with pro se parties
(and as I have noted throughout this Article, we also lack data on state civil
courts).84  As Part II will explain, the court that is the subject of this study is a
relatively formal administrative court.
A radically different proposal, advanced by Jessica Steinberg, rejects the
informal, procedural adjustment approach in favor of a new regime of proce-
dural and evidentiary rules designed for pro se courts.85  Steinberg argues for
new rules that would place the burden of case processing and factual devel-
opment on courts and judges rather than on parties.  In this vision, courts
would be responsible for advancing litigation by, for example, facilitating dis-
covery and ensuring relevant information is put on the record during eviden-
tiary hearings.  Steinberg’s proposal would turn the current system of party-
driven adjudication on its head, from the inception of a complaint through
the enforcement of a judgment.  In the courtroom, her proposal would see
pro se tribunals promulgate new rules allowing the admission of all evidence,
except privileged evidence, and charging judges with an affirmative duty to
make evidentiary determinations based on weight rather than admissibility.86
Steinberg argues judges are well-equipped to assess reliability and relevance
to determine the weight of evidence; where a judge has such a duty, pro se
litigants will be relieved of the burden of formally introducing evidence or
formally objecting to an opponent’s evidence.87
2. Judges Explaining Law and Process
Most pro se litigants lack the legal expertise necessary to navigate a civil
hearing.  Thus, one obvious way to help pro se parties is to give them some of
the information they lack via education about law, procedure, and the hear-
ing process.  During a civil hearing or trial, a pro se litigant without a lawyer
or other advocate has, practically speaking, no source of information other
than the judge.88  Given this, the idea that judges should play a role in pro-
84 See, e.g., Best et al., supra note 8, at 372–78 (finding wide variation in how individual
small claims judges conduct trials).
85 See Steinberg, supra note 11, at 947–63; see also Steinberg, supra note 1.
86 See Steinberg, supra note 1, at 798–99.
87 See id. at 799.  Steinberg’s proposal also includes a duty for judges to develop the
factual record, which I discuss separately below.
88 Russell Engler has noted, “How active a judge must be depends in part on how
much assistance the litigant receives before appearing before the judge.”  Engler, supra
note 15, at 386.  Some courts offer pro se litigants self-help resources, such as form plead-
ings, clerks trained to assist pro se litigants, legal information and advice sources, and
limited lawyer representation, to name a few.  However, as a general matter, these
resources are offered before, but not during, a court appearance. See Laura K. Abel, Evi-
dence-Based Access to Justice, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 295, 295–96 (2009); see also
DEBORAH SAUNDERS ET AL., CTR. ON COURT ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR ALL, ACCESS BRIEF: SELF-
HELP SERVICES 1–3 (2012), http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/
accessfair/id/263/filename/264.pdf. See generally SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, BEST
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 24 28-DEC-17 10:22
670 notre dame law review [vol. 93:2
viding information to pro se litigants is widespread in the access to justice
literature and is often a starting point for conversations about a changed
judicial role.
In the context of a civil hearing or trial, a judge might provide informa-
tion about the process of the hearing, evidence, substantive legal rules, bur-
dens of proof, and the issues to be decided in the hearing.89  Of these, a
fundamental practice cited in the literature is the judge’s role in ensuring
every party knows how the hearing will proceed, which might include the
order of testimony, the type of evidence that will be considered, how to make
an objection, and whether the judge will rule from the bench or in writing.90
The notion that judges can serve as sources of information for pro se
parties is grounded in the idea that giving information does not constitute
giving legal advice or serving as an advocate.91  Of course, the line between
legal information and legal advice is inevitably blurry and difficult (to say the
least) for even judges to navigate.92  Thus, reform proposals focus on a
judge’s role in explaining the rules of the game without suggesting what a
party’s next moves should be.  For example, one compilation of best prac-
tices by the American Judicature Society suggests the following framework for
a judge’s role in explaining procedure: “Instruct a self-represented litigant
how to accomplish a procedural action he or she is obviously attempting or
direct them to resources that will provide instructions.  Do not tell a self-
represented litigant what tactic to use, but explain how to accomplish the
procedural move he or she has chosen.”93
Implicit in the recommendation that judges have a role to play in
explaining law and process is the idea that a layperson will be able to take the
information she is given and apply it in a useful way in presenting or defend-
ing her case.  This notion has not been empirically tested and there is reason
to question its soundness.  First, we know that legal expertise is multifaceted
and strongly built on experience and education, which a pro se party likely
lacks by definition.94  Second, research on lay advocates who are permitted to
practice in certain court settings suggests that “while experienced nonlawyers
PRACTICES IN COURT-BASED PROGRAMS FOR THE SELF-REPRESENTED: CONCEPTS, ATTRIBUTES,
ISSUES FOR EXPLORATION, EXAMPLES, CONTACTS, AND RESOURCES (2008), https://
www.srln.org/system/files/attachments/SRLN%20Best%20Practices%20Guide
%20%282008%29.pdf (listing court-based self-help services).
89 See ZORZA, supra note 5, at 75–76, 82; Baldacci, supra note 5, at 671–73.
90 See GRAY, supra note 5, at 26–28.
91 Id. at 2.  Others have noted the lack of a meaningful distinction in doctrine and
practice between legal advice (generally impermissible) and legal information (permissi-
ble). See Engler, supra note 5, at 1994 (“The ease with which courts announce the rule
prohibiting advice-giving belies the difficulties in understanding and applying the rule.”).
92 See Goldschmidt, supra note 5, at 613 (describing how the line between legal infor-
mation and legal advice has become “blurred” in recent years).
93 See GRAY, supra note 5, at 32.
94 Legal expertise includes a substantive element (knowledge of formal law and proce-
dure) and a relational element (ability to navigate relationships with people in the court),
and these two elements combined constitute strategic expertise (a context-based synthesis
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 25 28-DEC-17 10:22
2017] active  judging  and  access  to  justice 671
can help parties through their expertise with common court procedures and
basic substantive legal concepts, they are not equipped to challenge judges
on contested issues of substantive or procedural law in individual cases.”95
Finally, research on unbundling, or limited-scope assistance from a lawyer,
presents a corollary example.  In unbundling, a lawyer provides a client with
a limited service, such as offering legal advice or preparing pleadings.  The
client then goes on to complete the case pro se.  The limited research on
unbundling suggests it may not help improve outcomes for pro se parties,
though it does help promote pro se parties’ senses of procedural justice.96
An open question for future research is whether judges’ explanations have
any effect on party choices or experiences.
3. Judges Eliciting Information From Litigants
Pro se parties face a major barrier in not knowing what information is
(and is not) legally relevant.  Even a litigant educated about the elements of
substantive law is unlikely to meaningfully appreciate how that law translates
to facts.  As a result, a layperson who finds herself in the midst of a civil
matter may miss the opportunity to offer critical facts or may unwittingly
introduce damaging facts because she does not know what is important as a
matter of law.97
In response, some reformers argue that judges should play a role in elic-
iting information from pro se parties, particularly information that develops
the factual record.  This proposal reflects a key critique of judicial passivity; it
risks cases being decided based upon incomplete information.  Arguments in
support of judges eliciting information stress the importance of deciding
cases on the merits, as well as ensuring pro se parties are not unfairly
prejudiced by their lack of knowledge about substantive law.98
All trial judges have discretion to ask questions of witnesses to develop
facts; given that, the notion that judges should ask questions of pro se liti-
gants should be relatively uncontroversial.  Indeed, appellate courts have sup-
ported judges asking questions to develop the record, to clarify facts, and to
authenticate evidence.99
of relational and strategic expertise). See Shanahan et al., supra note 3, at 489–92 (describ-
ing strategic expertise); see also Sandefur, supra note 4, at 911–12.
95 Carpenter et al., supra note 8, at 1.
96 See Steinberg, supra note 4; see also Molly M. Jennings & D. James Greiner, The Evolu-
tion of Unbundling in Litigation Matters: Three Case Studies and a Literature Review, 89 DENV. U.
L. REV. 825 (2012) (offering a bibliography and three case studies on unbundling, and
examining the unbundling movement).
97 See Steinberg, supra note 11, at 904–05.
98 See GRAY, supra note 5, at 2.
99 Id. at 34 (finding through a series of cases involving pro se parties that judges “may
ask questions that clarify and develop the issues to be decided, identify or admit evidence
and clarify issues for the self-represented litigant, clarify the litigant’s own questions and
witnesses’ responses to them, and elicit material facts” (footnotes omitted)).  Gray cites to
several cases that illustrate a judge’s “inherent” discretion to ask questions. See, e.g., id. at
33–34 (first citing United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1977); then citing
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Prominent access to justice scholars, including Russell Engler and
Deborah Rhode, have argued judges should assume responsibility for devel-
oping a full factual record.100  Engler supports judges calling witnesses and
conducting direct examinations where necessary and argues they should
review pleadings to ensure the full range of possible claims and defenses have
been asserted.101  Steinberg takes these arguments a step further.  She makes
the case that judges should have an affirmative duty to develop the record in
pro se cases.102  Steinberg argues judges should be required to identify the
legal issues to be decided in a case and to question parties and witnesses to
develop the facts necessary for a legal determination.103
At this time, the literature on active judging is mixed.  We do not have
sufficient empirical data to make categorical statements about how judges
behave in pro se cases, let alone studies that tell us about the effectiveness of
particular active judging practices.  Existing research suggests that jurisdic-
tions, courts, and individual judges differ in meaningful ways in how they
apply the law and enforce procedure as a general matter, as well as how they
engage with pro se litigants.  Given that research to date suggests variations
in judicial behavior, even in areas as fundamental as the application of settled
law, I expect to find some variation across the judges in this study, both in
terms of which practices they engage in, as well as how they engage in those
practices.  It is possible the variations will be quite striking, given what other
researchers have found in terms of intracourt differences among judges.
The next Part, which describes the study site, including the court itself, the
judges, and the law governing unemployment insurance appeals, offers fur-
ther insights regarding expectations for the qualitative interviews, including
expectations for the particular practices the judge might engage in and why.
As the next Part explains, judicial ethics and appellate caselaw in the study
site suggest that all three dimensions of active judging will likely be present in
the court, with variations in whether and how those dimensions appear
across the judges.
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The preceding review of the literature suggests this study can contribute
to our understanding of active judging by identifying how judges think about
their role in pro se cases, whether they are implementing active judging, the
Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 1941); then citing State v. Hutch, 861 P.2d
11, 15 (Haw. 1993); then citing Lapeyrouse v. Barbaree, 836 So. 2d 417, 423 (La. Ct. App.
2002); then citing Paulding-Putnam Coop., Inc. v. Kuhlman, 690 N.E.2d 52, 56 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1997); then citing Thaler & Thaler v. Rourke, 629 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (App. Div. 1995);
and then citing State v. Mellen, 583 P.2d 46, 48 (Utah 1978)).
100 See Engler, supra note 5, at 2029; Rhode, supra note 5, at 901; see also Baldacci, supra
note 5, at 697.
101 See Engler, supra note 5, at 2028–29.
102 See Steinberg, supra note 11, at 947.
103 Id. at 949–50.
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nature of their practices, and the factors that shape those practices.104  To
answer these questions, this Article draws on semistructured qualitative inter-
views with administrative law judges who preside over a predominantly pro se
docket of unemployment insurance appeals.  The parties are workers seeking
benefits and employers challenging workers’ qualifications for benefits.  This
Article is part of a broader study of the District of Columbia Office of Admin-
istrative Hearings (OAH) that includes one of the largest data sets collected
in a single civil justice setting in recent years.  In addition to the qualitative
interviews with judges presented in this Article, the broader study includes
quantitative data from 5,150 unemployment appeals filed at OAH and quali-
tative interviews with the representatives who practice in the court.105
A. Data
This Section describes the study site, including the court, the parties,
and the law and procedure of unemployment appeal hearings.  This includes
significant details about substantive law and procedure, as this information is
essential to understanding the active judging practices used by judges in this
court.  This Section also includes information about District of Columbia
judicial ethics, which provide more significant support for active judging
compared to other jurisdictions.  Finally, this Section covers District of
Columbia appellate caselaw that supports active judging in unemployment
appeals.
1. The Court
The Office of Administrative Hearings is an independent hearing body
created in 2001 by the District of Columbia Council to streamline and
improve the adjudication of cases arising from District agencies.106  OAH’s
unemployment insurance appeals docket is the focus of this study.  The adju-
dicators in these cases are appointed administrative law judges.107
104 For empirical studies of judging practices in lower courts, see supra note 7.
105 The broader study, of which this Article is a part, is informed by Professor
Shanahan’s and my experience representing clients in unemployment cases at OAH.
Though we did not conduct formal observations of hearings for this study, we have five
years of collective experience at OAH, including representing clients in more than 100
cases collectively.  Our interest in conducting this study grew out of our experiences at
OAH, and relationships with judges and staff formed during the course of that work that
made the study possible.
106 OAH began operating in 2004. COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, OFFICE OF THE
D.C. AUDITOR, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: RECOMMENDATIONS
TO IMPROVE DC’S OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 14 (2016).
107 Throughout this Article, I will refer to the study subject as judges.  ALJs are
appointed by the Commission on Selection and Tenure (COST), first for two-year terms
and then for six-year terms. See D.C. CODE § 2-1831.08(c)(2) (2016).
COST consists of three voting members, with one member appointed by the Mayor,
one member appointed by the Chairman of the DC Council, one member appointed by
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The typical images of informality that come to mind when one thinks of
an administrative court (adjudicators without robes, parties seated around a
conference table) are not representative of OAH.  Across the country, admin-
istrative hearing bodies vary in levels of formality with respect to physical
appearance, professional culture, and adherence to legal processes.108  As
discussed earlier, some administrative courts, like OAH, are more similar in
their procedural norms and culture to a court of general jurisdiction.109
In 2011, two years before this study began, a complete renovation of its
physical space dramatically changed the functionality and appearance of the
court.  OAH judges now sit at daises in traditional-looking courtrooms.  The
judges wear formal robes, and parties sit at separate counsel tables.  The
hearing rooms include a gallery and witness box.110  By contrast, many states’
unemployment appeal hearings are held exclusively by telephone or in infor-
mal conference rooms.111
In addition to formality in appearance, unemployment hearings at OAH
are also relatively procedurally formal.  Unemployment hearings follow hear-
ing processes outlined in District law and are subject to formal procedural
rules.112  Previous research has shown that procedures play an important role
in unemployment appellate litigation, but that pro se parties are less likely to
use procedures than representatives.113
In recent years, OAH has made changes to increase access to justice.
OAH created a self-help Resource Center that provides “how to” materials,
including materials on unemployment appeal hearings.114  The court also
the Chief Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, and two non-voting
members—the Chief ALJ and a representative appointed by the Attorney General.
COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, supra note 106, at 16 (citation omitted); see also D.C.
CODE § 2-1831.07(a).
108 Scholars have noted that ALJs and trial court judges face similar challenges in
attempting to assist and navigate their role vis-a`-vis pro se litigants, and that we lack empiri-
cal data on the relative formality of administrative courts and the ability of administrative
law judges to skillfully manage pro se litigation.  See, e.g., Baldacci, supra note 5, at 447–48.
For other studies of administrative courts, see KRITZER, supra note 17, at 24; Greiner &
Pattanayak, supra note 17.  For a previous study of OAH, see Portillo, supra note 7.
109 See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
110 Nina Schuyler, The Challenges and Rewards of an Administrative Law Judge, S.F. ATT’Y,
Spring 2010, at 39, http://www.sfbar.org/forms/sfam/q12010/administrative-law-
judges.pdf.
111 See generally id.
112 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 1, §§ 2980–99 (2016); see also Portillo, supra note 7, at 257
(concluding, based on a sociological study of forty-five unemployment insurance hearings
at OAH that “the hearing runs like traditional courtroom litigation”).
113 See Shanahan et al., supra note 3, at 470.
114 COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, supra note 106, at 51–55; OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEAR-
INGS RES. CTR., UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS, https://oah.dc.gov/sites/default/
files/dc/sites/oah/publication/attachments/UI-What_to_Expect_at_a_Hearing-Book
let.pdf.; OAH Resource Center, DC.GOV, http://oah.dc.gov/service/oah-resource-center (last
visited Oct. 20, 2017) (noting that the Resource Center has volunteers only part time dur-
ing the week; parties are present at OAH throughout the week).
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provides information about free legal services to all parties as part of the
scheduling order.115
a. The Judges
Almost all judges in the sample have a background in litigation work,
though the nature of that experience varies.  Many come from small prac-
tices, some from large firms, and others from government service.  Most
worked exclusively in civil law, while some had criminal practice experience.
Almost all confirmed during the interviews that they had experience appear-
ing in court during their time in practice, and almost all engaged in litigation
at some point in their careers prior to taking the bench.  A few had prior
experience as administrative law judges in other states before coming to
OAH.  Given the judges’ litigation and trial experience, it is likely that their
starting-point understanding of the judicial role was that of the traditional,
passive judge.
b. The Parties
On one side of an unemployment appeal is a worker who has an obvious
stake in the litigation because she has been separated from previous employ-
ment and is seeking unemployment benefits.116  The other party is the
worker’s former employer who has an incentive to contest the request for
benefits because the employer contribution to payroll taxes is based in part
on the number of former workers who have received unemployment
insurance.117
The majority of workers and employers at OAH have no representation,
but workers are most likely to be without counsel.  A full 82% of workers have
no representation, compared to 58% of employers.118  Looking at represen-
tation at the case level, neither party has representation in 49% of unemploy-
ment appeals.119
As self-representation rates suggest, workers are more likely to be the
classic “one-shot” litigants and “have nots” first described by Mark Galanter,
while employers are more likely to be “repeat players” and fall into Galanter’s
category of “haves.”120  Employer-parties include a full range of small and
large businesses, nonprofit organizations, and government agencies.
115 OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS RES. CTR., supra note 114, at 2.
116 This study does not include demographic information about the parties.  Pursuant
to a confidentiality agreement with OAH, this study did not collect party names or any
demographic information.  However, it is possible to describe the parties in general terms
based on research in other jurisdictions and observations based on my experience litigat-
ing unemployment appeals at OAH.
117 See D.C. CODE § 51-103 (2016).
118 See Carpenter et al., supra note 8, at 10.
119 Id.
120 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–107 (1974) (classifying parties in civil litigation as
“repeat players” or “one-shotters” and describing how better-resourced repeat players,
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Though a worker from any industry or profession may seek unemploy-
ment benefits, workers in unemployment appeal cases are disproportionately
low-income and people of color.121  Workers in professional and higher-wage
jobs have more stable employment prospects compared to workers in low-
status, low-wage jobs.122  Those in the latter group are more likely to be ter-
minated or to leave their job due to work conditions, health conditions, fam-
ily obligations, transportation problems, or other circumstances beyond their
control.123  They are also less likely to qualify for unemployment benefits and
are disproportionately represented in the ranks of those who have their ini-
tial application for benefits denied and find themselves fighting for benefits
in an appeal hearing.124
For the subset of workers and employers who have access to legal repre-
sentation, options include fee-based and free programs.  Worker representa-
tion tends to come from free legal services programs that include law school
clinical education programs, a service run by the District of Columbia govern-
ment called the Claimant Advocacy Program, and the Legal Aid Society.125
The vast majority of employer representatives are nonlawyers who contract
with human resources companies.126  Some employers may use in-house
which he calls the “haves,” gain advantage in litigation against one-shotters—the “have-
nots”); Shanahan et al., supra note 3, at 484–89 (describing the balance of power in unem-
ployment appeals at OAH).
121 AUSTIN NICHOLS & MARGARET SIMMS, URBAN INST., RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES
IN RECEIPT OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS DURING THE GREAT RECESSION (2012),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412596-Racial-and-
Ethnic-Differences-in-Receipt-of-Unemployment-Insurance-Benefits-During-the-Great-
Recession.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: LOW-WAGE
AND PART-TIME WORKERS CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE LOW RATES OF RECEIPT (2007), http://
www.gao.gov/assets/270/266500.pdf.
122 GREGORY ACS & AUSTIN NICHOLS, URBAN INST., LOW-INCOME WORKERS AND THEIR
EMPLOYERS: CHARACTERISTICS AND CHALLENGES (2007), https://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/411532-Low-Income-Workers-and-Their-Employ
ers.pdf; VICTORIA SMITH & BRIAN HALPIN, CTR. FOR POVERTY RESEARCH, LOW-WAGE WORK
UNCERTAINTY OFTEN TRAPS LOW-WAGE WORKERS, http://poverty.ucdavis.edu/sites/main/
files/file-attachments/smith_cpr_policy_brief_employability.pdf.
123 See OXFAM AM., HARD WORK, HARD LIVES: SURVEY EXPOSES HARSH REALITY FACED BY
LOW-WAGE WORKERS IN THE US (2013),  https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/
files/low-wage-worker-report-oxfam-america.pdf; Christine Vestal, An Unemployment Insur-
ance Balancing Act, STATELINE (June 1, 2010), https://web.archive.org/web/2014011303
0802/http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/an-unemployment-insur
ance-balancing-act-85899374819 (finding low-wage and part-time workers are less likely to
qualify for unemployment benefits than other workers).
124 See Vestal, supra note 123; see also Marc Lifsher, Jobless Benefits Wrongly Denied, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/26/business/la-fi-edd-
appeals-20140226 (highlighting the challenges California applicants wrongly denied bene-
fits face in navigating the appeals process).
125 For more on worker representation, see Shanahan et al., supra note 3, at 476.
126 Nonlawyer representation is permitted by OAH’s procedural rules. See D.C. Mun.
Regs. tit. 1, § 2982.1 (2016).
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counsel, in-house human resources staff, private attorneys, or the District’s
free Employer Advocacy Program.127
2. Unemployment Law and Procedure
Unemployment insurance is a joint federal-state program administered
by the states and funded through employer payroll taxes.  The Department
of Labor (DOL) provides federal oversight over the program and the Depart-
ment of Employment Services (DOES) is the District agency responsible for
administering it.
A worker in the District of Columbia first applies for unemployment
benefits by filing a claim with DOES, where a claims examiner makes an ini-
tial determination.  In common unemployment law parlance, workers are
known as “claimants” because they filed the initial application for benefits,
but either party may appeal the DOES decision to OAH.  Unemployment
appeals at OAH are reviewed de novo; the judge must make factual and legal
determinations without regard to the DOES determination.128
This study focuses on hearings involving one slice of unemployment
insurance law: a worker’s qualification for benefits.129  A worker may be dis-
qualified for one of two reasons: termination for misconduct or voluntary
resignation without good cause.130  Workers are presumed qualified for ben-
efits regardless of who appealed the underlying determination.  The
employer always bears the initial burden of proving disqualification.131
a. Procedural and Evidentiary Rules
The procedural rules—including rules of evidence—that govern unem-
ployment hearings are formalized in District law.132  These rules govern pre-
hearing, hearing, and post-hearing procedures.  This discussion focuses on
hearing procedures.133
A combination of District law and judicial discretion govern the hearing
process in unemployment appeals.  At the hearing, assuming both parties
appear, the employer first presents its case-in-chief, followed by the worker,
127 For more on employer representation, including a comparison of lawyer and non-
lawyer advocates at OAH, see Carpenter et al., supra note 8.
128 However, it is worth noting that the DOES determination is always part of the case
file, and, as a practical matter, can be reviewed by the judge in advance of the hearing.
129 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 1, § 2821.
130 See D.C. CODE § 51-110(a)–(b) (2016).
131 Id.
132 In this article, I use the terms “procedure” or “procedural rules” to refer to OAH’s
written procedural rules, including those governing evidence.
133 For an empirical examination of prehearing procedures at OAH and their relation-
ship to judging and access to justice, see Shanahan, supra note 22.
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should the worker decide to present evidence.134  The employer may offer a
rebuttal case.  Both parties have the right to cross-examine witnesses.135
Discovery is limited in unemployment appeal litigation, but parties must
disclose affirmative evidence, including documents and witness lists, three
days in advance of a hearing.136  In the hearings, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence are advisory, not binding, and hearsay is admissible.137  However,
judges are required to make findings as to the weight of any hearsay evi-
dence.138  Witnesses with personal knowledge are critical in unemployment
appeals because hearsay cannot serve as substantial evidence sufficient to sus-
tain a judgment in the face of conflicting nonhearsay testimony.139
b. Burdens of Proof
Burdens of proof play an important role in unemployment litigation.140
Given the legal standard, if a worker appears at the hearing and the employer
fails to appear, the worker wins automatically without a hearing on the mer-
its.141  During a hearing, if the employer does not meet its burden, the judge
may find for the worker at the close of the employer’s case.142
As my coresearchers and I found in a previous article, the burden of
proof can benefit workers if marshaled strategically, or it can harm them
when the reverse is true.143  We found that the use of procedures, including
introducing evidence, correlates with better case outcomes for employers,
while use of procedures correlates with worse case outcomes for workers.144
Because workers are in a defensive posture, a worker who takes the stand and
offers testimony or documentary evidence risks helping her employer meet
its burden.145
134 See D.C. CODE § 51-111 (providing guidelines for hearing procedure); see also D.C.
Mun. Regs. tit. 1, § 2822.4–.5.
135 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 1, § 2821.5.
136 See id. § 2985.1 (“At least three (3) business days before a hearing in an unemploy-
ment compensation case, a party shall serve on all other parties and file with the Clerk the
following: (a) A list of the witnesses, other than a party, whom the party intends to call to
testify; and (b) A copy of each exhibit that the party intends to offer into evidence, other
than exhibits to be used solely for impeachment or rebuttal.”).
137 See id. § 2821.12–.13.
138 See id. § 2821.12.
139 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 7, § 312.9–.10 (2016); see also Coal. for the Homeless v. D.C.
Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 653 A.2d 374, 377 (D.C. 1995).
140 See Shanahan et al., supra note 3, at 477.
141 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 1, § 2822.4; see also Rodriguez v. Filene’s Basement Inc., 905
A.2d 177, 180 (D.C. 2006).
142 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 1, § 2822.5.
143 See Shanahan et al., supra note 3, at 509–10.
144 See id. at 497–505.
145 See id. at 509–10.
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3. Active Judging in Unemployment Appeals
Two factors suggest this research will show OAH judges engaging in
active judging and give us some hints about the particular practices they
might employ.  First, the findings of a 2010 study by a sociologist suggest
OAH judges use active judging techniques when dealing with pro se liti-
gants.146  Second, controlling law, including judicial ethics, appellate deci-
sions, and evidentiary rules, supports it.
In 2012, the District of Columbia followed the lead of the ABA, which
revised the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to provide that a judge does not
violate Rule 2.2’s requirement of judicial impartiality if she makes “reasona-
ble accommodations” to ensure pro se litigants have their cases fairly
heard.147  The “reasonable accommodations” language, at a minimum, per-
mits judges to depart from the passive judicial norm, but provides no gui-
dance on the proper scope and nature of such departures.148  However, the
District of Columbia went further than the ABA and other states through
additional language on a judge’s obligations in pro se matters.  In a comment
to Rule 2.6, which covers a judge’s responsibility to ensure parties have the
right to be heard, the District added language stating that a judge has an
“affirmative” duty in this context.149  The comment then repeats the “reason-
able accommodations” language of Rule 2.2 and articulates what such accom-
modations might include: explaining the proceedings, procedural rules, and
judicial rulings; asking “neutral” questions; adjusting the order of taking evi-
dence; and avoiding legal jargon.150  Thus, in the District, all judges have
permission, as a matter of ethics, to engage in the three dimensions of active
judging.  That said, obvious questions still remain about the scope and
nature of those practices.
Turning to appellate law, the District’s highest court, the D.C. Court of
Appeals (DCCA), has been active in refining unemployment law in recent
years, including providing limited guidance on the permissible scope of judi-
146 Portillo, supra note 7. The study gives examples of the active judging practices the
researchers observed in cases where both parties are unrepresented, including judges ask-
ing questions to elicit testimony, but does not give examples of how judges behaved in
cases in which one party was represented and the other was not, beyond noting generally
that judges “reigned [sic] in their discretion” and “took on a more passive tone” when one
party was represented. Id. at 268.  The nature of the study’s reported observations make it
difficult to say with any certainty what judges were actually doing in cases with imbalanced
representation.  The study does clearly suggest judges take at least some steps to assist pro se
litigants as a general matter, and certainly in cases where both parties are unrepresented.
147 See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 R. 2.6, cmt. 1A (D.C. COURTS 2012).
According to the American Bar Association, thirty-five states had adopted the Revised
Model Code of Judicial Conduct as of August 22, 2016. See State Adoption of Revised Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, ABA (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/profes-
sional_responsibility/resources/judicial_ethics_regulation/map.html.
148 See, e.g., Engler, supra note 15, at 370; Jona Goldschmidt, Judicial Ethics and Assis-
tance to Self-Represented Litigants, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 324, 327 (2007).
149 See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 R. 2.6, cmt. 1A.
150 See id.
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cial interventions in pro se cases.  Two aspects of appellate review in OAH
appeals are unusual.  First, OAH appeals go directly to the highest court of
the District, without any intermediate review.  Second, the fact that regular
appellate court review is even possible in the District’s unemployment cases is
a remarkable thing in the world of poverty law.  An emerging critique of
lower courts considers the extent to which judges issue decisions that have no
obvious connection to the controlling legal standard and are not required to
put those decisions in writing, making decisions difficult both to interpret
and to appeal.151  Such practices have been documented in traditional areas
of poverty law, such as rental housing cases and domestic violence cases.152
In contrast, unemployment judges at OAH must issue written opinions stat-
ing the factual and legal basis for their decisions.153  This requirement allows
the appellate court to engage in meaningful scrutiny.
In three cases decided between 2008 and 2010, the DCCA acknowledged
active judging practices in unemployment appeals.  The issues addressed in
these cases mirror the three dimensions of active judging discussed in Part I:
adjusting procedures, explaining the law and hearing processes, and eliciting
information from parties.
In the dimension of explaining law and process, the DCCA has
instructed OAH judges to clearly describe the burden of proof and its impli-
cations to a pro se litigant.154  In the same decision, the court was careful to
note that it does not endorse judges giving parties “tactical advice,” but it did
151 Though we lack empirical knowledge of the extent to which law does or does not
guide the proceedings and decisions in lower courts, scholars have studied lower courts
where law seems to play a limited role in judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g., Bezdek, supra
note 7 (finding that judges rarely ask questions establishing the required burden of proof
but instead treat the hearings in a more summary fashion); Cotton, supra note 9, at 67
(describing a housing court where “the law seemingly played little role in how the judges
disposed of these cases” and “[j]udges seldom made explicit reference to the law or
explained their decision-making in terms of the law”).
152 See Cotton, supra note 9, at 67.
153 See D.C. CODE § 2-509(e) (2016).  The DCCA has repeatedly admonished the agency
that in the conduct of its proceedings it must comply with the Administrative Procedure
Act. See Wash. Times v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 530 A.2d 1186, 1190 (D.C. 1987);
Wallace v. Dist. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 289 A.2d 885, 886–87 (D.C. 1972).
154 See Beynum v. Arch Training Ctr., 998 A.2d 316, 320 (D.C. 2010); Berkley v. D.C.
Transit, Inc., 950 A.2d 749, 758 (D.C. 2008); Rhea v. Designmark Serv., Inc., 942 A.2d 651
(D.C. 2008).  In Berkley, the employer did not appear at the evidentiary hearing, a situation
in which the worker bears no burden of proof and need not produce any evidence in order
to prevail. 950 A.2d at 752.  During the hearing, the judge made statements about the
burden of proof that led the worker to believe she needed to put evidence on the record,
including stating, “[I]f you choose to testify, you can meet your burden.” Id. at 753.  As a
result, the worker testified, and in doing so, provided evidence that led her to lose the case.
Id. at 755.  The DCCA found that the judge prejudiced the worker through a “confusing
and erroneous explanation of the burden of proof.” Id. at 759.  The court noted that the
burden of proof “may well be incomprehensible to a pro se litigant.” Id. at 757.  In the
decision, the court sent a clear message that OAH judges must accurately explain the bur-
den of proof and its effect on pro se litigants. See id. at 758.
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not define what might constitute such advice.155  The court also gave OAH
judges permission to elicit information from pro se parties where necessary
to gather “material facts.”156  Finally, the court found that strictly applying
“procedural technicalities” is not always appropriate in pro se litigation.157
In its decisions on active judging, the DCCA has focused on two key
issues: the “remedial” nature of the unemployment statute and the reality of
pro se litigation.  The court found that these two issues place unemployment
appeal hearings in a special category where some exceptions to traditional
procedures may be appropriate.158  In this context, the court emphasized
that workers are usually the party bringing the fewest resources to litiga-
tion.159  Yet the court takes pains not to articulate the full scope of a judge’s
role in assisting pro se parties, consistent with the cautious approach com-
monly taken by appellate courts.160
The court’s decisions on active judging achieve two ends.  First, they
identify limited situations in which OAH unemployment judges are clearly
permitted to intervene in pro se litigation.  Second, they more broadly signal
that while the appellate court has not considered every possible situation
where active judging is permitted, and may not be ready to articulate a com-
prehensive doctrine on active judging, the door is open for OAH judges to
assist pro se litigants in situations beyond those explicitly approved by the
DCCA to date.
Finally, OAH’s procedural and evidentiary rules incorporate elements of
Steinberg’s proposed reforms.  Namely, the Federal Rules of Evidence pro-
vide guidance in unemployment appeals, but are not binding; hearsay evi-
dence is expressly admissible; and judges are required to assess reliability to
155 See Berkley, 950 A.2d at 758.
156 See Beynum, 998 A.2d at 320.  In Beynum, the DCCA explicitly instructed OAH judges
to ask questions of pro se witnesses when needed. Id.  The decision recognizes that most
workers in unemployment litigation are pro se and states it would be unreasonable to set
“too high a threshold” for these parties to articulate material facts. Id.  The court ulti-
mately instructs unemployment judges to, if necessary, “probe” witnesses for “further clari-
fication of material facts.” Id.
157 Rhea, 942 A.2d at 655–56.  In Rhea, the court, largely in dicta, articulated the need
for flexibility in the application of procedural rules to pro se litigants. See id.  This case
asked whether the OAH judge and the appellate court itself could properly consider an
argument that was never raised by the pro se worker, where that argument, if accepted, was
dispositive in favor of the worker. Id. at 656.  The court answered this question affirma-
tively and explained that the unemployment compensation statute “relies largely on lay
persons, operating without legal assistance, to initiate and litigate administrative and judi-
cial proceedings” and stated the principle that “[p]rocedural technicalities are particularly
inappropriate” in this statutory context. Id. at 655 (quoting Goodman v. D.C. Rental Hous.
Comm’n, 573 A.2d 1293, 1299 (D.C. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
158 See id. at 655 (noting that “the unemployment compensation statute is remedial in
character”).
159 See id.
160 See Engler, supra note 15, at 375–76; Engler, supra note 5, at 2013–14; Steinberg,
supra note 11, at 927.
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determine the weight of evidence and to articulate their findings.161  This
procedural framework gives judges the freedom to consider all available evi-
dence and weigh its authenticity and reliability, and it places the burden of
making such determinations squarely on the judge rather than relying on the
parties to establish and argue the admissibility of evidence.
Taken together, the factors described above—past research, ethics rules,
appellate court decisions, and the burden placed on judges to make eviden-
tiary determinations—suggest the interviews will reveal a group of judges
who engage in active judging and see it as part of their role when dealing
with pro se parties.  In addition, these factors suggest particular practices the
judges might employ.  The judges are likely to be flexible about procedures,
adjusting them to accommodate pro se parties, as the appellate court has
given them permission, albeit without any particular guidance on the bounds
of this practice.  They are likely to routinely help parties authenticate and
articulate the relevance of evidence pursuant to the court’s procedural rules.
They will likely also explain law, procedures, and hearing processes to pro se
parties, as this practice is approved by both the DCCA and the District’s Code
of Judicial Conduct.  I expect the judges will place particular emphasis on
explaining the burden of proof and its implications to pro se workers
because the appellate court has specifically directed them to do so.  I also
expect most of the judges to ask questions to elicit factual information given
that the DCCA and the Code of Judicial Conduct have allowed judges to do
so when necessary.
Beyond this, I expect the judges will see themselves as having some room
to experiment and try different active judging practices, given that the DCCA
has repeatedly emphasized the importance of judges taking special care not
to leave pro se parties to fend entirely for themselves.  However, we also know
that all of the judges worked in litigation before they took the bench, and
that most have had courtroom experience.  Inevitably, these experiences
working within the context of the adversary system will influence their views
of what is appropriate and fair in the judicial role.  Finally, as discussed in
Part I, I still expect to see some variations in whether, and in what ways, OAH
judges engage with pro se litigants for two main reasons.  First, the fact that
previous research on lower courts shows wide variations in the application of
law, judicial style, and treatment of pro se parties, even across judges in the
same court, suggests variations will exist across judges at OAH.  Second,
though the District’s judicial ethics and the DCCA have given more substan-
tial guidance on judicial engagement with pro se parties than is available in
most jurisdictions, much of this guidance is broad and flexible enough to be
open to interpretation by individual judges.  Perhaps the only exception is
the DCCA’s strong admonishment that unemployment judges must explain
the burden of proof to pro se workers and ensure they understand it.
Beyond this area, individual judges have discretion to decide when to adjust
procedures; which procedures to adjust; how to, and the extent to which they
161 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 1, § 2821.12–.13 (2016); id. tit. 7, § 312.9–.10.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 37 28-DEC-17 10:22
2017] active  judging  and  access  to  justice 683
should, explain law and hearing process; and when and how to elicit informa-
tion from pro se parties.
B. Methodology
This study uses qualitative research methods; namely, semi-structured
qualitative interviews.  This approach is particularly appropriate because this
research aims to understand not only whether judges engage in active prac-
tices, but more importantly, what practices they engage in and why.162  As
compared to survey or experimental data, qualitative interviews offer a more
nuanced and comprehensive view of social relationships, processes, and
meaning.163  Qualitative studies, like this one, typically rely on small sample
sizes and in-depth study of subjects.164
To identify subjects for the qualitative interviews, I limited the study sam-
ple to sixteen judges who heard unemployment appeals between January
2011 and June 2013, the period of data collection in the broader study.  After
obtaining permission from the Chief Administrative Law Judge and the Prin-
cipal Unemployment Insurance Judge at OAH, I contacted all sixteen judges
via email to request an interview.  Twelve judges responded affirmatively.165
All but two of the judges were still on the bench at OAH at the time of their
interview, though not all were still hearing unemployment appeals.  It is
unlikely that the results of this study are subject to nonresponse bias.  Of the
four judges who were contacted but not interviewed, three did not respond
at all.  I have no reason to believe these three judges differ in meaningful
ways from those judges who were interviewed.  The fourth judge who was
contacted but not interviewed was interested in being interviewed but was
working at a new court that did not permit her to participate in the study.
My coresearchers, two research assistants, and I conducted an approxi-
mately hour-long telephone interview with each of the twelve judges who
agreed to be interviewed.166  Two researchers participated in each call, with
one researcher interviewing and the other taking notes.
The interviews covered five broad topics: judicial style and philosophy,
dealing with pro se parties, dealing with different representative types, the
role of procedures in a predominantly pro se court, and the role of judges
162 See generally HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S.
Lincoln eds., 2d ed. 2000).
163 See MICHE`LE LAMONT & PATRICIA WHITE, WORKSHOP ON INTERDISCIPLINARY STAN-
DARDS FOR SYSTEMATIC QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 4 (2005), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/
lamont/files/issqr_workshop_rpt.pdf.
164 See id.
165 Given that the qualitative interviews relied on convenience sampling, it is important
to note that it is possible that those who agreed to be interviewed are different in some way
from those who did not agree.
166 The research protocol was reviewed and approved by the University of Tulsa’s Insti-
tutional Review Board (IRB).  The research was exempt from full board review.  Pursuant
to IRB requirements, all interview subjects signed an informed consent form.  They were
not compensated for their participation.
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and courts in access to justice efforts.167  The same protocol was used for all
interviews, but the specific issues discussed with each judge varied based on
the judge’s interests, the flow of the conversation, and the time available.  As
is true of all qualitative work, the interviews themselves were an iterative pro-
cess where judges raised issues we had not predicted.  In some cases, we
chose to incorporate those issues in later interviews.  Some issues came up in
all or many interviews, while others came up in only a few, and I have indi-
cated this where necessary to aid the reader’s understanding.  Where any
theme was not commonly discussed, I have indicated this explicitly.  In
reporting the data, I have focused on providing representative quotations
and on identifying similarities and differences in the themes the judges
raised.
In the research protocol and in the reporting of data in this Article, I
have made every effort to preserve the anonymity of the research subjects.  In
support of this goal, I use female pronouns exclusively and identify each
judge using a number.  The sample of judges includes both men and women.
III. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
The findings are presented in three parts that respond to this study’s
whether, how, and why questions about active judging: (1) whether judges
engage in active judging; (2) the variations in active judging practices; and
(3) the sources of guidance that influence active judging.168  Here, I briefly
summarize the findings and then discuss them in greater detail.
First, this is a group of judges who clearly see themselves as playing a role
in facilitating fairness and access for pro se parties.  For all of the judges, this
involves some form of active judging.
Second, while the judges share a commitment to assisting pro se litigants
through some form of active judging, their views and practices vary across the
three dimensions of active judging.  In the first dimension, all are willing to
adjust procedures to accommodate pro se litigants.  In the other two dimen-
sions, explaining law and process and eliciting information, judges’ practices
vary.  The variations appear to be shaped by individual judges’ senses of what
is fair and also, importantly, by the burden of proof.  The results suggest
there is no single model of or approach to active judging, or even a one-
dimensional spectrum of active versus passive judging.  Instead, active judg-
ing may be best viewed as multidimensional (see Diagram 1 below).  The
findings also suggest the existing literature has paid insufficient attention to
the needs of parties without the burden of proof and that fairness and fidelity
to law may require different treatment for differently situated parties.
167 Given the breadth and depth of the data collected in these interviews, this Article
focuses on a particular set of themes present in the data; future articles will explore other
themes.
168 The findings are based on how judges describe conducting hearings where at least
one pro se litigant is present.  In the interviews, judges also spoke about how they conduct
hearings when both parties are represented.  Where I report how judges think about repre-
sented parties or hearings with any form of representation, I note it explicitly.
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Third, the variations in active judging exist in this court despite the fact
that the judges draw on the same three sources of guidance, namely, the
DCCA, the DOL, and one another, through peer observations of hearings.
The findings make clear that individual judges, and the bench as a whole,
have evolved in their views and practices over time.  The three sources of
guidance have played a critical role by supporting active judging as a general
matter.  Yet differences in practice persist across the judges.  The findings
highlight the extent to which individual judges are left to make their own
decisions about how best to facilitate fairness in pro se litigation.  They also
suggest consistency in active judging may be elusive, and, at the very least,
may require more substantial guidance than that offered to judges in this
court.
A. Whether to Engage in Active Judging
A baseline question of this study is whether the interview subjects see
active judging as part of their role.  The answer to this question is a resound-
ing “yes.”  Each of the subjects described engaging in some form of active
judging to ensure fairness for pro se parties.  While there are important varia-
tions in practices across the judges, as discussed in Section III.B below, it is
clear that none of the judges wholly subscribe to the traditional, passive judi-
cial role.  The judges used words and phrases like “guide,” “intervene,”
“explain,” “level the playing field,” “balance the scales,” and “more than a
referee” in describing their role.  Many judges described great sensitivity to
the experience of pro se parties.  Judge 5 said, “It’s scary enough being in
court with a lawyer.  It’s exponentially more scary being there without a law-
yer.  I want people not to be afraid.”
Being an active judge was not the default position for the judges when
they began work at OAH.  Most described an on-the-job learning curve, both
in how to be a judge as a general matter and in how to be a judge in pro se
cases.  Judge 6’s response was characteristic of the group.  When asked how
she learned to be a judge, Judge 6 said, “By being one.”
A number of judges recounted how they transitioned away from the
traditional, passive conception of the judicial role toward a more active role.
For these judges, the active role is not merely optional, but a necessary part
of being a judge in a pro se court.  Judge 12 described “unlearning what [I]
learned in law school about what a judge is supposed to do” and went on to
say that there is “no access to justice in sitting back silently and being a fed-
eral judge.”  Describing how she learned to work with pro se litigants, Judge 1
explained, “[When I started] I really tried—because of our litigants—to
think about what it would be like for someone who knew nothing—about
legal process, about the law . . . . [I]t was an exercise in imagination.”
The DCCA and District judicial ethics allow, and in some situations,
require, judges to assist pro se parties.  Thus, it is not surprising that the
judges at OAH see intervention, as opposed to passivity, as an appropriate
part of their role.  Given this, it also makes sense that most judges expressed
sensitivity to the unique needs of pro se litigants.  However, as discussed ear-
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lier, these authorities offer limited instruction on the scope and details of
judicial interventions.
What practices are appropriate and in what contexts?  Should practices
differ when both parties, as opposed to only one party, are unrepresented?
What role do burdens of proof play?  When can procedural rules be
adjusted?  What are the limits of judges’ explanations?  How should judges
elicit testimony, and are there limits on this practice?  What is the role of
substantive law?  As the next set of findings shows, for the most part, these are
questions that individual judges are left to decide for themselves based on
their own ideas and intuitions about what is fair and appropriate when deal-
ing with pro se parties, and also by drawing on external guidance.
B. Variations in Active Judging Practices
The second question is what judges are doing when they interact with
pro se parties.  The findings here are mixed, with similarities in some areas of
practice and divergence in others.  Though the judges universally expressed
their willingness to intervene and engage in active judging to ensure fairness
and access for pro se litigants, judges’ views about what is fair and appropri-
ate vary.  The findings make clear that it may be one thing to speak generally
about active judging in pro se litigation and another to examine the details of
particular judging practices.
The interview data suggest judicial practice is not linear, but mul-
tidimensional, and should be conceptualized in terms of particular forms of
judicial activity that individual judges might employ, rather than characteriz-
ing any one judge as wholly “active” or “passive.”  Earlier, I described three
dimensions of active judging: adjusting procedures, explaining law and pro-
cess, and eliciting information.  In this Section, I use these three dimensions
as a framework for analyzing the variations in judicial activity.  Breaking a
judge’s work into these dimensions and examining the component parts of
each allows for more nuanced thinking about what judges are actually doing
in the courtroom.
To summarize, the area of greatest similarity across the judges is their
willingness to adjust procedures for pro se parties.  Judges report adjusting
procedures by applying principles rather than following the letter of proce-
dural rules.  In the dimension of explaining, all judges explain basic hearing
processes, but beyond this, they differ in two ways: the timing of explanations
and, most importantly, whether to explain the elements of substantive law.
Some judges believe explaining substantive law in detail risks tainting testi-
mony and offers an unfair advantage to the employer, who bears the burden
of proof.  In the dimension of eliciting information, most judges said that
asking questions to elicit information, including developing the factual
record, is part of their role and reported routinely doing so, but some judges
are much less inclined to ask questions than others.  In addition, many
judges intentionally treat workers and employers differently due to the bur-
den of proof, choosing not to question workers where an employer has not
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met their burden.  The diagram below offers a visual representation of the
multidimensional nature of active judging at OAH.








1. Judges Adjusting Procedures
A critical dimension of active judging and judicial intervention concerns
formal procedures and whether judges will ignore or alter procedural and
evidentiary rules to assist pro se litigants.  Here, the findings are consistent
with expectations.  The interviews revealed that adjusting procedures is an
area of significant agreement and similarity among the unemployment
judges.  Every judge who discussed it said she supports the idea that procedu-
ral and evidentiary rules should not be applied strictly to pro se parties in
most cases.  Many also said that such rules should not stand in the way of
getting relevant evidence on the record.  The judges largely adhere to the
“informal” approach to procedures advocated by many access to justice schol-
ars and are thus willing to adjust procedural rules in pro se cases.
When dealing with pro se parties, most judges described relying largely
on principles to determine whether and how to enforce procedural and evi-
dentiary rules rather than following the letter of the rules.  Judge 2’s state-
ment reflects the majority approach of applying principles over procedures
in pro se cases: “Procedural rules cannot be a barrier to getting evidence on
the record or testimony.  I’m not going to let these rules get in the way.  On
the flip side, there are some issues with fundamental fairness that are rule
based.”
The judges err on the side of introducing evidence with the goal of
ensuring that cases are, as some framed it, “fully heard.”  For example, Judge
12 noted that she goes “the extra mile to eliminate overly technical road-
blocks in the process so [pro se parties] can get their story out.”  This “princi-
ples over procedures” approach is consistent with recommendations from
the access to justice literature, which emphasizes a full hearing of the evi-
dence and flexibility in applying procedural rules.
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A particular OAH procedural rule is representative of how the unem-
ployment judges adjust procedures for pro se litigants.  Often called the
“three-day rule,” it requires parties to disclose documents and witness lists to
the other party at least three days prior to a hearing.169  Beyond this rule,
there is no formal (or functional) discovery process in unemployment
appeals.  In the interviews, eleven of the twelve judges discussed their
approach to this rule, which is of obvious importance to employer parties
who are most likely to use documentary evidence to meet their burden of
proof.
The judges who spoke about the three-day rule all described applying a
principle-based approach when pro se parties fail to disclose evidence in
advance of a hearing, rather than rigidly applying the disclosure rule and
excluding the documents.  These judges said they analyze the prejudice to
the other party when determining whether to allow undisclosed evidence on
the record.  Most said that preventing prejudice is the underlying principle
behind the three-day rule itself.170
Judge 6 described why she would allow evidence in despite a party’s fail-
ure to meet the three-day requirement: “The purpose of the rule is to allow
parties the opportunity to review the document and defend against it.  So I’m
not going to throw it out just because they didn’t meet the three-day rule.”
Describing the reverse scenario, Judge 2 said, “Sometimes people come in
with documents that the other side has never seen before . . . and I won’t let
them introduce the documents, and I’ll rely on the [three-day] rule to do
that.”
The balance of power also plays a role in the enforcement of procedural
rules.  Potential power imbalances include an asymmetry of knowledge or an
imbalance of representation.  Here, judges described being lenient and
adjusting procedures when pro se parties act in good faith but simply do not
know the rules.  For example, Judge 10 said she is inclined to admit undis-
closed evidence “particularly when a [worker] comes in with a bunch of doc-
uments and they look at you like a deer in a headlight.”  In contrast, the
judges take a dim view of sophisticated parties, or lawyers, who attempt to use
procedural rules to gain advantage.
The judges described enforcing procedural rules when they perceive a
party is acting in bad faith.  Speaking about the three-day rule, Judge 5 said
169 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 1, § 2985.1 (2016).
170 Though the judges’ expressed views on applying procedural rules to pro se parties
are strikingly similar, a few judges described themselves as “more liberal” than other
judges, called other judges “more strict” or referred to a “split” among judges when it
comes to enforcing the three-day rule.  Of course, a clear line between “strict” and “liberal”
practices is difficult to draw based on the interviews.  Absent detailed information drawn
from hearing observation, it is impossible to identify with any certainty which judges are in
fact more or less “strict,” and indeed, whether such a split actually exists.  However, we do
know that eleven of the twelve judges interviewed say they apply the prejudice principle
when pro se parties bring undisclosed documents to a hearing, and we know some judges
consider themselves to be more likely to let in undisclosed documents as compared to
their colleagues.
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that she would not let documents in if she perceived a party had been “delib-
erate” in withholding them.  A number of judges explicitly noted that they
hold employers, more likely to be the sophisticated party, to a higher stan-
dard.  Judge 6, quoted above describing her willingness to adjust procedures,
said, “If the employer doesn’t disclose, nine times out of ten I won’t take it
because he should know and comply with the rules, period.”  Finally, Judge
12 offered an example of dealing with procedural rules and party
sophistication:
There have been times when I thought a litigant was going beyond the pale,
times when more sophisticated litigants have sandbagged the other side.  In
one of the worst cases where I excluded witnesses and documents, I had a
party come in with a half-dozen undisclosed witnesses and undisclosed docu-
ments.  I had to do a reality check.  Is that unfamiliarity with the system?  I
have to weigh protecting the other side.  I won’t tolerate intentional
gamesmanship.
The judges also described resistance to representatives using procedures
against pro se parties in cases with imbalanced representation.  In this con-
text, Judge 5 explicitly referenced access to justice principles and said that
cases should be about evidence, not who “is a better strategizer.”  Judge 10,
speaking about dealing with lawyers going up against pro se parties, said:
I have never been a great fan of the adversary system—it works great when
Microsoft and Google are fighting it out, but it does not work well when you
have an imbalance between [pro se] parties and lawyers.  I’m fairly interven-
tionist . . . . [I]f [a] lawyer is being too aggressive I will frequently just over-
rule them rather quickly.
In their procedural decision making, the judges described erring on the
side of hearing evidence and using an approach that balances the need to
accommodate pro se parties with the need to prevent unfair advantage.
Overall, the judges were remarkably consistent in their expressed willingness
to be flexible and adjust the enforcement of procedural rules, preferring to
use principles to guide their decisionmaking.  Finally, the judges who dis-
cussed procedures and representation said they hold representatives, and
thus their clients, to a different standard, including when representation is
imbalanced in a case.  Most described enforcing procedural and evidentiary
rules more strictly when dealing with represented parties.
The findings here raise important questions about predictability, consis-
tency, and the purpose of procedural and evidentiary rules in pro se litiga-
tion.  Recall that the primary approach advocated by scholars to date has
been one of flexibility and informality in applying procedural rules to pro se
parties, an approach similar to that of inquisitorial proceedings in its empha-
sis on gathering facts.  The “principles over procedures” approach used by
the OAH judges is similar to that advocated by the bulk of the scholarly litera-
ture.171  This approach has the obvious benefits of offering leniency to pro se
171 Jessica Steinberg has criticized the flexible or principle-based approach, arguing it
promotes inconsistency and unpredictability.  She proposes a rule-based regime that places
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parties who lack legal expertise and helping to ensure that procedures do not
(unnecessarily) stand in the way of putting facts on the record, but at what
cost?  Where judges make procedural adjustments, their actions may benefit
pro se parties at the cost of predictability and consistency, both across the
justice system and within individual cases.
An example drawn from a real unemployment case illustrates the
point.172  Both parties are represented by counsel.  The employer alleges
misconduct based on the worker testing positive for having marijuana in her
system.  At the hearing, the lawyer for the employer attempts to introduce a
record of the drug test, a document prepared by the drug testing company.
The contents and meaning of the record are not obvious to a layperson.  The
lawyer does not have a witness to lay a foundation for the document.  Coun-
sel for the worker objects on the grounds of authentication and relevance,
and the judge sustains the objection.  The employer has no additional evi-
dence.  The worker’s lawyer moves for judgment as a matter of law, arguing
the employer has not met their burden of proof.  The judge grants the
motion and the worker wins, a purely procedural victory.
Imagine the employer in this case had no representation.  Should the
judge let the drug test in because the employer did not know he needed to
bring a witness to authenticate and explain the contents of the document?
The principles over procedures or informality approach would counsel in
favor of letting the drug test in were the employer pro se, a move that would
almost certainly reverse the outcome of the case.  Are we comfortable with
this result?  If we do what some scholars have suggested and create a partially
or fully inquisitorial process, will we be comfortable with that process existing
only for those who lack counsel?  What then becomes of cases with
imbalanced representation?  Can we accept a system with one set of rules for
those who have representation and one set of rules for those who do not?
2. Judges Explaining Law and Process
The judicial role in explaining various aspects of law and process to pro
se parties is a key area of judicial intervention identified by scholars and, as
discussed in Part II, the DCCA has called on judges to explain, in particular,
the burden of proof to pro se workers.  As expected, the judges reported
willingness to engage in this active judging practice and universally described
it as a critical part of their role.  All judges said they explain basic hearing
processes at the outset of the hearing, and all reported explaining procedu-
ral and evidentiary rules at some point during hearings.  However, there is a
significant split in two areas.  First, between those who give lengthy explana-
tions at the beginning of hearings and those who give information only as
needed, and second, between judges who explain substantive law in detail
and those who give only basic explanations.
the burden of case processing and fidelity to procedure on the court. See Steinberg, supra
note 11, at 905.
172 This example is drawn from a case I handled at OAH.
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a. Explaining Hearing Processes
The regulatory framework governing unemployment appeals includes
standards for opening explanations in hearings—standards promulgated and
enforced by the DOL, which oversees the unemployment insurance pro-
gram.173  The interviews indicate that the judges follow the standards set out
by the DOL, which require judges to explain certain aspects of the hearing
process.  Thus, the fact and content of opening explanations are areas of
relative consistency across the judges.  Every judge said they give an opening
explanation before taking evidence in a case.  Judge 6 reported that she says
“the same thing at the beginning of every hearing” and explains “how the
process will go in the hearing room.”  All of the judges described giving, at a
minimum, information about the process to be followed at the hearing.
Many of the judges noted that they explain the order of testimony, the right
to cross-examine witnesses, and the burden of proof; most said they welcome
questions from the parties; and many referenced DOL requirements as a
source of guidance in this area.
b. When and How Much to Explain
Some judges go further than explaining process and also explain proce-
dural rules, evidentiary rules, or substantive law before taking evidence.  This
presents the first area of notable divergence across the judges: when to give
information (beyond basic process explanations) to pro se litigants.  The
judges were evenly split on whether and how much to explain the law and the
hearing process to pro se parties.  One approach, used by half of the judges,
is to give a detailed explanation of procedure, evidentiary issues, and (for
those who choose to describe it in detail) substantive law at the outset of the
hearing.  The other practice is to give only limited information at the outset
of the hearing and to fill in information on an as-needed basis while the
hearing progresses.  This split is clearly well known among the judges, as a
few judges made a point of noting the stark differences in approach on the
unemployment bench.  A number of judges in the latter camp explicitly
noted how their style differs from those in the former.  In fact, some in the
173 See 42 U.S.C. § 503 (2012); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ET HANDBOOK NO. 382:
HANDBOOK FOR MEASURING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LOWER AUTHORITY APPEALS QUALITY
(3d ed. 2011), https://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/ETAH/ET_Handbook_No_382_
3rd_Edition.pdf [hereinafter ET HANDBOOK].  The DOL’s ET Handbook sets out criteria
and an evaluation process for determining whether state unemployment insurance appeals
processes offer an “[o]pportunity for a fair hearing, before an impartial tribunal, for all
individuals whose claims for unemployment compensation are denied.”  42 U.S.C.
§ 503(a)(3).  As described in the ET Handbook, one of the evaluation criteria is whether
judges should offer basic logistical information: identify the parties and witnesses, note the
date and location of the hearing, provide the name of the judge, and list the issues to be
considered at the hearing (such as whether a worker is qualified for benefits). ET HAND-
BOOK, supra, at 11–13.  For history and analysis of the “fair hearing” in the welfare benefits
context, as well as a theory of “adaptable due process,” see generally Jason Parkin, Adapta-
ble Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (2012).
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“as-needed” camp described how observing other judges’ hearings taught
them that long explanations were not useful.
The judges who give detailed information at the outset of the hearing
reason that they want parties to be fully informed from the start about all
aspects of a hearing.  Judges who fall into the “as-needed” camp were critical
of this approach for reasons relating to their views about litigants’ emotions
and ability to retain information, as Judge 9 stated: “More important with pro
se litigants is explaining every little thing along the way and not frontloading
with a lot of explanation that is over people’s heads. . . . I think some ALJs
frontload hearings with [a] lot of information that goes over the head of the
person and makes them nervous.”
Judge 12 described being influenced by other judges:
I’ve listened to tapes of other judges from time to time.  Very bright people.
And their opening explanation will go on for twelve to fifteen minutes, and
by then I’m lost.  So my view is, keep it simple, and then at the end I do, in
my most earnest tone, tell each side, “If you have questions about procedure,
please don’t be shy.”
The questions of when and how much to explain to pro se parties are
areas of divergent practice across the judges.  It is clear that both camps
believe their strategy is effective.  Ultimately, in the absence of empirical gui-
dance regarding how best to communicate hearing process information to
pro se litigants, all of the judges, regardless of approach, are operating based
on their experience, observations, and intuition.
c. Explaining
The judges are also split on the critical question of how in-depth their
explanations of substantive law should be, a split that appears to be grounded
in different notions of fairness.  Interestingly, these differences are also well
known among the judges.  Unprompted, a number of judges explicitly stated
that they did things differently than their colleagues and proceeded to com-
pare and contrast the variations in practice among the judges.  Thus, the
OAH bench is keenly aware of internal differences in active judging
practices.
All of the judges said they offer a basic explanation of substantive law.  At
a minimum, this includes naming the two ways a party can be disqualified
(for misconduct or a voluntary quit without good cause) and the fact that
employers bear the burden of proof.174  For most of the judges, the explana-
tion ends there.  But four judges said they explain substantive law in detail by
listing the elements of misconduct or voluntary quit and/or describing the
types of proof that would meet those legal standards.
Those who give a detailed explanation appear to be motivated by a
desire to give complete information to both sides of the case—they see this as
being the fairest approach.  In contrast, those who give only a basic explana-
174 Recall that employers have the burden of proof in unemployment cases, including
the full burden in misconduct cases and the initial burden in voluntary quit cases.
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tion say they do not want to give the party with the burden of proof (the
employer) a “roadmap” on how to prove its case.175  However, the latter
group of judges do not simply leave gaps in the factual record and areas of
law unaddressed; instead, they ask questions to elicit the information they
need, as subsection III.B.3 discusses in greater detail below.
Many of those in the “basic explanation” group explicitly distinguished
themselves from their colleagues in the “detailed explanation” group, noting
that there is a split view on the bench; the reverse was not true.  Both groups
of judges said that the choice of how to handle explanations of substantive
law is based on principles of fairness and access, yet the two approaches have
markedly different implications.  This suggests a fundamental difference in
judges’ views about what is fair in this context.
Turning first to the judges who give detailed information, one judge
described her approach to explaining substantive law using the example of
intent, an element required for a finding of misconduct.176  Intent is not a
particularly intuitive concept for a layperson and is challenging to prove, as it
must be established by circumstantial evidence barring an admission by the
worker.  Thus, it is easy to imagine an unrepresented employer neglecting to
address the issue of intent during their case-in-chief.  On this point, Judge 10
said:
As part of the introduction [at the beginning of the hearing], I will describe
what they’re required to do.  I will say that misconduct requires intentional
disregard of an employer’s expectations or rules, and I explain gross versus
simple misconduct and go into considerable detail, and by that I mean I just
simply make clear that this is what you have to do.  Negligence is not miscon-
duct.  I am looking for evidence of intentional disregard . . . . I spend some
time on who has the burden of proof—what they’re responsible for doing in
the hearing.  What would I want to know if I were in their situation?  If you
have questions, I can’t give you legal advice, but I can answer questions
about anything that is confusing.177
Those who do not explain substantive law take the position that a judge’s
explanation of the elements of misconduct, such as intent, crosses an inap-
propriate line into assisting parties with strategy, as opposed to process.
These judges believe that explaining law in detail is fundamentally unfair to
the worker because it risks benefitting the employer, who bears the burden of
proof, by telling the employer how to make its case.  Judge 12, who does not
175 Interview with Judge 12.
176 See Hamilton v. Hojeij Branded Food, Inc., 41 A.3d 464, 478 (D.C. 2012) (finding
no misconduct because the worker was fired for excessive absences caused by circum-
stances beyond her control and, thus, no intent was found); Gilmore v. Atl. Servs. Grp., 17
A.3d 558, 565 (D.C. 2011) (finding no misconduct by a worker fired due to absences from
unforeseen incarceration); Odeniran v. Hanley Wood, LLC, 985 A.2d 421, 430 (D.C. 2009)
(holding that ordinary negligence does not constitute misconduct).
177 There are two forms of misconduct under D.C. law.  A worker found to have com-
mitted gross misconduct in the course of his separation from employment will be com-
pletely disqualified from benefits, while a worker who is found to have committed simple
misconduct will be disqualified for only eight weeks. See D.C. CODE § 51-110(b) (2016).
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explain substantive law, mentioned the intent element and compared herself
to her colleagues who choose to explain it:
I don’t explain substantive law.  Other judges go down the road of explain-
ing the need to show intent, rather than the need to show generally unac-
ceptable behavior [on the part of the worker], some go as far as explaining
[the difference between] gross and simple [misconduct].  I avoid this for a
number of reasons.  For pro se litigants, that sort of explanation can get
bogged down in minutiae.  They get distracted.  The second problem, in my
view, is that it is a roadmap on how to win rather than [an explanation of]
how to put on evidence . . . . [I]t is not fair to give the employer my best
advice on how to put on winning case.  Or [to give advice on] the best
defense . . . . I am guiding process, not strategy.
Judge 9 also raised concerns about fairness and the risk of giving strategic
advice, saying,
I’m afraid if I give them substantive law, they will color testimony or craft the
presentation so that it may not be as candid as I’d like it to be.  I tell them
there are two kinds of cases—misconduct and quit.  I explain who has [the]
burden of proof.  But I don’t tell them what they need to prove . . . . I know
other ALJs go into more depth, such as the difference between gross and
simple [misconduct].  I don’t think it’s necessary and it’s counterproductive.
And it’s unfair to the party without the burden of proof.  I don’t want legal
arguments from parties, I want the facts.
The division between those who explain substantive law and those who
do not is an area where judges with similar professed goals and concerns
about pro se litigants achieve those goals using very different practices.
Judges who do not explain substantive law strongly believe that doing so
would be unfair to workers by giving employers a roadmap on how to win
their case.  Of course, there is no reason to believe that those judges who
choose to explain substantive law intend to give an advantage to the party
with the burden of proof.  They are surely doing so because they hold a con-
flicting opinion: explaining the law is the fairest approach.178  Here again,
absent guidance on whether, when, and to what extent to explain law and the
178 Judge 2 raised a different example of how this practice can play out in an area of
misconduct law known as a rule violation.  D.C. law holds that where an employer fires a
worker for violating a company policy or rule, that worker cannot be disqualified from
unemployment benefits unless the employer can prove the worker knew of the rule, the
rule was reasonable, and the rule was enforced consistently. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 7,
§ 312.7 (2016).  A pro se employer without previous experience in unemployment law
would have no way of knowing that each of these three prongs must be met and that at
least one (consistent enforcement) is also not necessarily intuitive.  In fact, this judge has
clearly learned from experience that pro se employers miss addressing the three prongs of
a rule violation.  Discussing her approach to rule violation cases, Judge 2 said:
Judges in trial courts at the start of cases explain the law, and I do . . . . [L]et me
put it this way, the D.C. Court of Appeals wants us to be an active court.  So, I
explain the law before we start . . . . [P]ro se parties shouldn’t lose because they
don’t understand which questions they need to answer in order to prevail.  For
example, in a rule violation [case], the employer has to follow certain steps—
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hearing process to parties, individual judges determine their own approaches
based on their best judgment.  The result is a substantial divergence in prac-
tices across this group of judges when it comes to explaining law and process
to pro se parties.
These findings point to the need for a more nuanced discussion of a
judge’s role in explaining substantive law.  The literature to date has assumed
that judges’ explanations of process, procedure, and law are all presump-
tively neutral practices that do not benefit either party.179  This research
upends those assumptions and suggests access to justice scholars should
engage in a deeper exploration of the interaction between active judging and
burdens of proof.
3. Eliciting Information
When it comes to eliciting information from parties, a final area of judi-
cial intervention drawn from the literature, the interviews revealed two key
findings.  First, asking questions of parties is a relatively uncontroversial and
common practice among the judges.  Though two judges are reluctant to ask
questions—one of which asserts she almost never does so—the vast majority
of judges elicit information through questioning as matter of routine.  Here,
the DCCA plays a pivotal role in giving the judges permission to ask questions
and develop facts.  Second, substantive law, and in particular the burden of
proof, is critically important in how and whether judges elicit information in
unemployment hearings.  For example, most judges will not elicit informa-
tion from a worker unless the employer has met their burden of proof.
a. Active vs. Passive Approach to Eliciting Information
All of the judges in the sample expressed some level of willingness to
intervene and ask questions to obtain background information (such as years
on the job or job title) and to clarify confusing testimony.  When it comes to
eliciting relevant factual information, only two judges expressed strong reser-
vations about asking questions, indicating that they do so only rarely.  One of
these, Judge 7, said, “Even if there are questions I want to ask, I try not to do
that.”  The other, Judge 8, seemed a bit more ambivalent, saying, “I think my
role is to be as neutral as I can.  That’s why I will ask questions only to clarify
what has been said.  But, I might violate this from time to time . . . if one of
the elements is missing, I might ask about that.”  The other ten judges said it
is part of their role to develop the factual record and they routinely ask ques-
tions to elicit such information.
Judge 10’s description of her approach succinctly captures the majority
view: “My job is to find out what happened.  I do that by letting parties put on
[the] case and then asking questions to get what I need.”  As Judge 10’s state-
including [proving that] the employee knew the rule.  Employers also trip over
consistent enforcement, and I’ll explain that.
179 See generally GRAY, supra note 5; Albrecht et al., supra note 5; Steinberg, supra note 7,
at 25–30; Zorza, supra note 5.
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ment suggests, most of the judges who actively develop the record allow par-
ties to present their cases for a period of time before intervening.  Only one
judge described taking almost complete control of the presentation of evi-
dence as a rule, by asking questions of witnesses starting at the very beginning
of their testimony.
Many judges described how their views on asking questions, and those of
their colleagues on the unemployment bench, evolved over the years to
embrace a more active role.  A number of judges noted that when OAH and
the unemployment docket first began in 2004, court leadership encouraged
judges not to ask questions because doing so was not a “neutral” practice.
This evolution tracks broader shifts in awareness of access to justice issues
among the judiciary, and it also reflects changes in the law.  Notably, a num-
ber of judges said the DCCA supports eliciting information in unemployment
appeals.  As Judge 3 said:
I’ve always taken the position that I have to develop the record so I can make
an informed and reasonable decision . . . . I think the Court of Appeals
supports that position.  I know that’s a fine line, I can’t be an advocate for
either party, but if I have a situation where I know what the issues are and I
do not see where there’s evidence addressing that and I need more informa-
tion, I try not to interrupt the parties, but at the end of their cases, if I have
questions, I’ll ask specific questions.  A lot of times, especially with pro se
parties, they may not know how to present the evidence and themselves in
the best light.
Another important theme involves how to elicit facts—namely, whether
to frame questions in terms of the law or to ask open-ended questions.  This
raises similar considerations to those that arise in the context of providing
information about substantive law.  Some judges said that when they ask
questions, they do not explicitly name the element or legal issue they are
looking for (for example, asking an employer to talk about intent) but
instead use hypotheticals and open-ended questions to obtain relevant infor-
mation.  The concern is that naming the legal element will shape the testi-
mony too directly, in the same way that describing elements of substantive
law may have that same effect.  Judge 9 described this concern and her
approach.  Her statement below is in response to a question about whether
she would ask an employer about consistent enforcement, one prong of a
rule violation misconduct case, if the employer had not discussed it:
I used to not ask.  Then, I thought, they don’t know what they’re doing.  But
I don’t ask the question directly; I don’t say, “Do you enforce the rule con-
sistently?”  That’s going to elicit a “yes.”  I do hypotheticals: “Have you had
similar situations with other employees?  What happened in those cases?”  I
beat around the bush, but I get a sense of whether this was enforced solely
against this person.
The balance of power between the parties, which includes imbalances in
representation status, also comes into play in the context of eliciting informa-
tion.  A few judges stated that they have higher expectations of employers in
terms of their abilities to present their cases, given that they tend to have
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more resources.  A few said they take special steps to assist pro se workers in
defending their cases because they are typically the less sophisticated party,
the party with the least resources, and the party least likely to have previous
experience in unemployment cases.  As Judge 2 said:
Most of the time, but not always, employers have a lot more resources than
former employees.  So, with [workers], I might ask more questions and prod
them to give information they might not otherwise know to give.  For exam-
ple, if you get fired for time and attendance problems, why you were late
becomes an issue.  Was public transport not picking you up?  Did your house
burn down?  Was your child sick?  I’ll make sure that the nuance of those
questions is fleshed out.  Because employers have more resources, I rely on
them to know a little bit more, to be better prepared.
Judge 2’s approach raises obvious questions about fairness and neutral-
ity.  Should she be eliciting defenses to misconduct from workers?  Is it
acceptable only if she similarly elicits relevant facts from employers?  Or is it
permissible for a judge to “correct” for an imbalance of information or
sophistication?  Does it matter what is at stake for each party?  In the back-
ground of these questions is the real-world effect of winning or losing on
workers as compared to employers.  Workers who lose an appeal will lose
their only immediate source of income, whereas employers who lose face an
increase in unemployment taxes at some point in the future.  Should these
differences matter in how a judge intervenes in an unemployment case?
b. Role of Substantive Law and Burdens of Proof
An assumption pervasive in the literature is that a full airing of the facts,
or the need to get the “full story”180 is an important goal in pro se litigation,
and implicitly, in all litigation.  This is often framed in terms of pro se par-
ties’ right to “hav[e] the full opportunity to present their case”181 and in
terms of a judge’s duty to develop a full factual record, with some scholars
placing more or less emphasis on the inquisitorial model.182
In this context, the interview data raises a critical question that has not
been fully addressed in the literature: what role does the burden of proof
play in how judges elicit information in pro se cases?  The data in this study
show that substantive law, and in particular the burden of proof, leads some
unemployment judges to treat parties differently, which is driven by explicit
goals of fairness.  The burden of proof shapes how judges approach eliciting
information; specifically, it shapes whether and how they elicit information
from workers.  And here again, the appellate court plays an important role.
180 See, e.g., Baldacci, supra note 5, at 479; Pearce, supra note 5, at 976; Richard Zorza,
Some First Thoughts on Court Simplification: The Key to Civil Access and Justice Transformation, 61
DRAKE L. REV. 845, 865 (2013) (“Research has shown the value and appropriateness of
judicial questioning and engagement in ensuring full information is before the court.”).
181 See Zorza, supra note 5, at 443.
182 See GRAY, supra note 5, at 89; Baldacci, supra note 5, at 696; Engler, supra note 5, at
2029; Rhode, supra note 5, at 901.
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A number of judges noted that putting factual information on the
record generally benefits the employer and that asking questions of workers
runs the risk of prodding them into a potentially harmful admission.  In two
concrete ways repeatedly mentioned during the interviews, a judge’s atten-
tiveness to the burden of proof will determine whether or not the judge gath-
ers any information at all from a worker.  One situation arises when an
employer fails to appear for the hearing, and the other, when an employer
fails to meet the burden of proof during its case-in-chief.
In unemployment hearings, either party may fail to appear.  As a num-
ber of judges noted, when an employer does not appear, many pro se work-
ers want to testify and tell their side of the story, and many enter the hearing
room assuming they must do so.  Of course, workers in this situation are not
obligated to testify; in fact, the only way a worker can lose is by putting evi-
dence on the record.
All five judges who spoke about this situation said they advise workers
about the burden of proof and attempt to point out that the worker will win
if he or she does nothing at all.  The judges said they will continue to advise a
worker about the burden of proof in increasingly strong terms, short of tell-
ing them expressly what to do, until the worker realizes what is in their best
interest.  One mentioned, “Some people ignore this advice,” but most said
they will continue to press until it clicks.
This activity is arguably in the gray area between what is and is not legal
advice, and the judges seem to be aware of the tension.  A number of the
judges noted, as Judge 10 did, that the DCCA has “practically admonished”
the unemployment bench to take great care in clearly explaining the burden
of proof and its implications in an employer no-show situation.183  Judge 10
described her approach this way:
I explain the burden on the employer to prove misconduct, that you have
the right to testify, but you have the right not to, and if you testify and you
say something that leads me to believe misconduct is the reason you were
fired, I will hear that.  If someone says that they want to testify, I will say,
“Wait, let me explain again.”  After the third time, they will usually get the
idea.
A second situation where burdens affect whether judges hear a worker’s
testimony is when an employer presents its case-in-chief but does not make a
prima facie case for disqualification.  Seven judges discussed this situation,
and one expressed strong reservations about intervening, but the other six
said they have ruled on a sua sponte motion for judgment or issued a
directed verdict in this situation.184  Judge 11 framed the issue in terms of
judicial economy, “To save the court’s time and resources . . . when the
employer has presented their case and they have not proven any reasons that
constitute misconduct, I absolutely rule sua sponte.”
183 See supra notes 154–155, 179 and accompanying text.
184 One judge said she does this even when a claimant is represented by counsel where
counsel has not made a motion.
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The vast majority of the unemployment judges are clearly comfortable in
the active judging role of eliciting factual information, and most believe they
have an affirmative obligation to do so.  For many judges, the duty to develop
the factual record is also mediated by the burden of proof and influenced by
the DCCA’s “admonishment” not to mislead workers into testifying.185
These judges are not seeking “the truth” in an inquisitorial fashion; they are
following the letter of the law and requiring the employer to make a prima
facie case before they will gather any information from the worker.  For these
judges, active judging is not just about eliciting information, it is also about
intervening to stop or prevent evidence from coming into the record when it
is no longer necessary as a matter of law.
These findings challenge and complicate common themes in the litera-
ture, which suggest the interests of justice are best served by a full hearing of
the facts.  Yet, we know that in unemployment cases workers often harm their
cases by offering evidence, as this evidence may help to carry the employer’s
burden.186  Previous research in this court has shown that introducing evi-
dence is associated with lower win rates for workers and higher win rates for
employers.187  When examining a judge’s role in eliciting information, we
must ask, is it fair to let pro se workers testify even if the employer’s case is
deficient?  If truth seeking is the goal, perhaps fairness does call for workers
to testify, even if it harms their case.  But what about the burden of proof?  In
a case where both parties have representation and the employer’s case is defi-
cient, the worker may never have to testify because her lawyer would advise
her not to.  Are we comfortable with allowing the substantive law to drive the
presentation of evidence only in cases with representation, and not in those
without?  The majority of judges at OAH have a clear stance on this issue:
they are not willing to implement a fully inquisitorial system, one that would
require workers to testify no matter the strength of the employer’s case;
instead, they view this as fundamentally unfair.  However, research suggests
that their approach is not necessarily consistent with those of other courts.  A
recent study found that judges in many court settings do not follow the law
with respect to burdens of proof and instead treat cases summarily.188  This
suggests the need for more exploration into the relationship between pro se
ligation, active judging, and burdens of proof.
C. Sources of Guidance on Active Judging
An important goal of this research is to begin to ascertain what forces
might shape a judge’s approach to pro se litigation.  For a judge who is decid-
185 Berkley v. D.C. Transit, Inc., 950 A.2d 749, 756–57 (D.C. 2008).
186 See Shanahan et al., supra note 3, at 501, 509–12.
187 See id. at 501.
188 See Sandefur, supra note 4, at 925 (“Observers in [some court settings] report that
judges often shortcut the law: they do not hold landlords to statutory burdens of proof,
[and] they fail to examine eviction notices to confirm their validity and proper service. . . .
Judges often do not require landlords to rebut self-representing tenants’ defenses to evic-
tion or do not recognize their defenses.” (citations omitted)).
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ing whether or how to use active judging strategies, where does she find gui-
dance?  If the judges have similar sources of guidance, why do we see such
notable variations across the judges?
The literature review tells us there is no single, authoritative source of
guidance on whether and how to implement active judging, even for admin-
istrative law judges.  Broadly speaking, judges are left to reconcile and opera-
tionalize the duty of impartiality with permission to offer “reasonable
accommodations” to pro se parties.  But in the OAH context, judges have
additional sources to draw on.  We know that the DCCA has issued decisions
supportive of certain active judging practices, and that the DOL, which regu-
lates unemployment appeals, requires certain active judging practices.  The
findings have already shown that the judges reference both as sources of gui-
dance.  We also know the judges are aware of one another’s practices, includ-
ing the differences between them.  This Section explicitly looks at these three
sources of guidance for OAH judges and how they influence active judging
practices in the court.
To summarize, the interviews reveal three categories of guidance that
shape the active judging practices of OAH judges.  First, DCCA decisions
allow (or push, depending on a judge’s baseline view of the need for passiv-
ity) OAH judges to actively explain law and process, elicit factual informa-
tion, and adjust procedural rules.  Second, a DOL peer review requirement,
where judges observe and grade one another’s hearings on a quarterly basis,
offers a source of comparative information about how other judges handle
pro se cases.  The existence of this peer review requirement explains why
variations in active judging practices are common knowledge among the
judges.  Third, DOL requirements specifically shape the practice of providing
information about hearing processes at the beginning of a hearing.189
189 Another interesting feature of the unemployment bench is an internal peer review
system for final written orders.  Though it is not a source of guidance on active judging, it
is an important consistency and accountability tool in other ways.  Under this system,
before a judge issues a final order in an unemployment case, the order must be reviewed
and approved by two other unemployment judges.  The goals of the system include review-
ing both substance (including the interpretation of controlling law and the application of
law to the evidence in the record) and style (including everything from catching grammati-
cal errors to clarity of language).  The judges emphasized that peer review plays an impor-
tant role in training new judges on the application of substantive law, clarifying the
meaning of appellate court rulings, and simplifying language to make orders more under-
standable for pro se parties.  Judge 7 called it “very important and a great learning tool.”
Judge 11 said:
If it were not required, I would do it voluntarily.  We do not have law clerks so
there is no one else to put a set of eyes on it before it goes out except another
judge in the [peer review] system.  A lot of it is just picking up grammatical errors
and a better way to say it.  Or you did not adequately address this issue.  Or men-
tioning facts that you did not find in the case . . . . I find it very helpful and also a
good way to help the individual judges improve and hone their skills.  You may
see the way a judge approaches an issue, so you keep it in mind for the future.
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1. Appellate Court
The interviews make clear that the DCCA has played a critical role in
shaping active judging at OAH.  As Judge 3 put it, “The D.C. Court of
Appeals wants us to be an active court.”  In fact, without prompting, most of
the judges discussed the importance of the appellate court.  According to the
judges, the DCCA has shaped their practices in two ways: by permitting
judges to assist pro se parties as a general matter and by approving specific
active judging practices.  In fact, most judges expressed the sense that they
are not only permitted to be active, but that it is expected.  As Judge 1 said,
“The Court of Appeals tells us to not let people flounder around—that’s not
consistent with access to justice principles or good practice as a jurist.”
The appeals court’s specific guidance in two areas, explaining the bur-
den of proof and eliciting factual information, came up most often in the
interviews.  First, the judges have clearly internalized the importance of the
burden of proof and the need to ensure pro se parties (workers, in particu-
lar) understand its implications.  Speaking about the need to communicate
the burden of proof to pro se workers, Judge 10 said she and her colleagues
are “practically admonished” to do so by the DCCA.  The appellate court’s
ruling on this issue appears to play a significant role in permitting judges to
grant sua sponte motions for judgment when employers have not made a
case, and to dissuade pro se workers from testifying when the employer fails
to appear.
Second, when it comes to eliciting facts, the judges described an evolu-
tion on the OAH bench, one facilitated by the court of appeals.  A number of
judges said, in the early days of OAH, lead judges on the unemployment
bench emphasized passivity and opposed eliciting information.  Judge 9 said,
“Initially, [OAH leadership] instructed us to just let parties present evidence
and we weren’t supposed to be prodding and questioning because then we
weren’t neutral.”  She then described how the DCCA allowed her to change
her approach: “We got a D.C. Court of Appeals case that instructed us to act
like hearing examiners and ask important questions.  I felt more comfortable
that way because I don’t like decisions by trick.”  Judge 9 now feels free to
elicit facts, as needed, from pro se parties.
Finally, though the DCCA has spoken on the issue of adjusting proce-
dures, holding that “procedural technicalities” are not always appropriate in
pro se litigation,190 the judges did not reference the appellate court as a
source of guidance in this dimension of active judging.  One potential expla-
nation is that the court is an important source of guidance on this issue, but
the judges simply neglected to mention it.  Another possibility is that the idea
of judges adjusting procedures has gained a level of acceptance such that
judges do not feel the need to turn to the DCCA for support.  Given that
adjusting procedures is such a fundamental and widely accepted activity in
the literature, the latter seems quite likely.
190 Rhea v. Designmark Serv., Inc., 942 A.2d 651, 655–56 (D.C. 2008).
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2. Department of Labor
The DOL oversees all state unemployment benefits programs191 and, as
part of its regulatory role, requires quarterly and annual reporting on hear-
ing practices.  In this reporting process, OAH judges review and grade their
colleagues’ case files and recorded hearings using DOL-provided criteria.192
This process offers judges guidance on active judging practices in two ways
that came up repeatedly in the interviews: by giving judges an opportunity to
observe and learn from one another and by requiring that judges give partic-
ular information in their opening statements at the beginning of each
hearing.
a. Peer Review
In the DOL peer review process, OAH must randomly select twenty cases
per quarter for review.  Each is reviewed by a judge who listens to the hearing
recording, examines exhibits, reads the final order, and scores the case based
on a comprehensive set of thirty-one criteria.  Items to be scored include
whether the judge gave a prehearing process explanation, allowed parties to
cross-examine witnesses, spoke in clear language, asked noncompound ques-
tions, took control over any interruptions, exhibited bias, and issued an
understandable written decision.193  The possible scores include “good,”
“fair,” “unsatisfactory,” and “did not occur.”  The purpose of each criterion is
clearly defined and explained.
Interestingly, none of the judges complained about the requirement of
reviewing one another’s hearings, a necessarily time-consuming process.
Instead, they described the review process in positive terms.  Judge 10 did
note that some reviewers take the process more seriously than others in terms
of the quality of their reviews, but she added, “most are conscientious” and
make substantive written comments in addition to scoring the hearing.
In the interviews, the judges were never asked explicitly whether they
learned from their colleagues, nor were they asked to compare themselves to
their colleagues, yet the judges raised these two points repeatedly and
unprompted.  Eight of the twelve judges mentioned that they learned from
listening to other judges’ hearings.  They reported seeing things that worked,
191 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3) (2012).  The Social Security Act provides that the federal
government will not fund states’ unemployment insurance programs unless certain crite-
ria, including an opportunity for a fair hearing, are met. Id.
192 See ET HANDBOOK, supra note 173, at 6–10.
193 The DOL uses thirty-one different criteria to review the quality of state unemploy-
ment insurance appeal hearings. See id. at 11–62.  Five of the criteria are specifically used
to determine whether hearings meet the basic requirements of a “fair hearing“ and “due
process,” including: (1) the opportunity to confront witnesses and hear all evidence
presented by opposing parties; (2) the opportunity to cross-examine opposing witnesses;
(3) a hearing limited to the issues set forth in the hearing notice (barring the consent of
all parties to add additional issues); (4) a fair and impartial adjudicator; and (5) a final
decision that includes findings of fact and conclusions of law. See id. at 5.
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which they would incorporate into their own hearings, as well as things that
did not work, which they sought to avoid.
b. Opening Explanations
The purpose of the DOL peer review process is to ensure a minimum
level of consistency in how judges handle hearings.  The interview data sug-
gest the process accomplishes this goal most effectively in one area: the open-
ing explanation.  The elements individual judges said they include in their
opening explanations were consistent across the interviews in terms of their
minimum content, as discussed earlier in the findings.  Several judges
referred to the DOL requirements as the basis of their opening patter, and
some said that listening to other judges’ hearings through the peer review
process gave them ideas to incorporate into their opening statements.
Given the lack of empirical studies of active judging, there are no other
case studies to which we can compare these findings.  That said, the limited
information available suggests OAH judges likely have access to more sources
of guidance on active judging than do judges in other administrative courts
or courts of general jurisdiction.  The literature review suggests the DCCA’s
positions on active judging are unusual in terms of providing baseline sup-
port for active judging and offering specific guidance on particular practices,
as few other appellate courts have done so.  In addition, the guidance pro-
vided by the DOL is unique to unemployment appeals courts.
Yet, despite these shared sources of guidance, we still see meaningful
variations across OAH judges.  In many ways, this is not surprising.  In the
area of greatest consistency, the opening explanation, the guidance available
to the judges is concrete, detailed, and clear.  It is also an area where the
judge is mostly focused on transmitting information, rather than navigating
interactions with parties in the courtroom.  The DOL requires a basic patter,
provides a list of items to cover, and it is simple enough for all judges to
implement this requirement.
In another area of notable consistency, the DCCA has advised judges
about the importance of explaining to pro se workers the role and impact of
the burden of proof.  This guidance is relatively straightforward and con-
crete.  As a result, the judges who spoke on this issue all indicated they follow
the DCCA’s guidance consistently.
Things become more complicated in other areas where the guidance is
less concrete and lacks detail, and where the judge is not merely transmitting
information but navigating interactions with parties in the courtroom.  For
example, the DCCA has instructed OAH judges to, where necessary, “probe”
witnesses for “material facts” to develop the record, but the DCCA has not
offered a framework for understanding the situations in which such fact gath-
ering is necessary or the most appropriate way to gather such information.
Thus, we see in the interview data that asking questions of parties is common
among the judges, but that there is notable variation in how the judges elicit
information.  Some judges frame their questions explicitly in terms of the
legal issue at hand (such as “Do you enforce the rule consistently?”), while
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others use hypotheticals or ask questions in a way that does not directly point
to a legal issue.
Finally, in an area where there is no official guidance from the DCCA or
DOL, whether and how to explain substantive law, the judges’ only source of
information is one another and we see significant variations in practice.
Some judges believe explaining the law is essential, while others believe it
unfairly benefits the party with the burden of proof.  These views are strongly
held and well known among the judges.
Where does all of this leave us?  Without similar studies as comparison
points, it is not possible to say with any certainty whether OAH is a relatively
cohesive and consistent court or a relatively inconsistent court in terms of
active judging practices.  This study shows meaningful variations in practice
within OAH, but we cannot know empirically whether this level of variation is
more or less than we would expect to see in other courts.  It does appear that
guidance from the DCCA and DOL, particularly guidance that is concrete
and detailed, drives consistency at OAH, while general guidance or a lack of
guidance supports greater variations in practices—a result that makes intui-
tive sense.  It is also likely that peer reviews play a role in supporting consis-
tency, as judges reported altering their practices based on observing their
colleagues.  These findings suggest that consistency in active judging prac-
tices may be an elusive goal and that it may depend in large part on the
presence of meaningful guidance from authorities such as appellate courts,
regulatory bodies, and other judges.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
This study offers new insights into active judging practices and the forces
that shape those practices.  It also raises new questions.  In this Part, I will
address some potential implications of this research and suggest directions
for future study of active judging and pro se litigation.
One study alone cannot satisfy the many unanswered questions about
how to respond to the massive pro se crisis in America’s civil courts.  But this
research has offered much-needed insights into the nature of active judging
practices on the ground.  We learned that this group of judges is willing to
adjust procedures to accommodate pro se parties, though this practice raises
critical questions about the justice system’s consistency.  We discovered that
explaining law is an area of great variation across the judges, with some view-
ing it as essential and others viewing it as fundamentally unfair to the party
without the burden of proof.  We found that all of the judges believe they
have a duty to elicit facts, but that their approaches vary—some judges ask
questions framed in terms of the law, while others would never do so.  These
differences persist though the judges share sources of guidance about active
judging practices and though they routinely observe one another’s work as
part of a mandatory peer review process.
Based on this study alone, we cannot quantify or explain the effects of
the variations in active judging practices we observed in this court.  Instead,
we can recognize these differences exist, attempt to understand why they
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 59 28-DEC-17 10:22
2017] active  judging  and  access  to  justice 705
exist, and suggest implications for reform of the civil justice system.  Much
more research is needed to understand whether and how other courts and
judges are responding to the pro se litigation crisis and to understand how
different approaches to active judging affect individual litigants and our jus-
tice system as a whole.
This study points to the need for more research into how state court
judges are responding to the pro se crisis and to the need for more research
into state civil courts more broadly.  This research analyzed active judging
across three dimensions, with the goal of promoting conceptual clarity in
how we think about what it is judges are “doing” when they interact with pro
se parties. More work could be done to understand each of these dimensions.
Is one dimension more important than others in ensuring fairness, or in
ensuring pro se parties understand court proceedings and perceive them as
fair?  What other dimensions might exist?  Future studies might examine
more deeply the sources of guidance judges rely on as they learn to manage
pro se cases, including which sources are most influential and which judges
find most useful.
A. The Role of Substantive Law and Burdens of Proof
The findings suggest that the legal context of a case, particularly the
burden of proof, is a critical mediating factor in active judging.  This point
has not yet been addressed by the scholarly literature.  Much of the existing
conversation about active judging focuses on the importance of judges help-
ing parties put facts on the record in a variation of the inquisitorial model.
The emphasis of most active judging literature is on the need for a full airing
of the facts, whether by a judge explaining law or eliciting information.  The
literature takes for granted that the goal of fact gathering is a presumptively
neutral practice that does not benefit either party.194
Yet, in this study, most OAH judges are not seeking the truth in an
inquisitorial fashion; they are following the letter of the law and requiring
the employer to make a prima facie case before they will gather any informa-
tion from the worker.  For these judges, active judging is not solely about
eliciting information for the sake of having all of the facts on the record, it is
also about intervening to stop or prevent evidence from coming into the
record when it is no longer necessary as a matter of law.  Thus, the burden of
proof mediates active judging in this context.
This research reveals the extent to which existing scholarship empha-
sizes the needs of parties who bear the burden of proof, as opposed to those
in a defensive posture, and calls into question whether eliciting information
is in fact an inherently neutral practice.  Might fairness in active judging
require judges to treat plaintiffs and defendants differently, given the role of
substantive law and burdens?  This question is particularly critical given that
we now know the vast majority of unrepresented parties in nonfamily state
194 See generally GRAY, supra note 5; Albrecht et al., supra note 5; Steinberg, supra note 7,
at 25–33; Zorza, supra note 5.
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court cases are defendants and that many of those defendants will face a
lawyer on the other side of the case.195
This suggests the need for a context-based exploration of the interaction
between substantive law, burdens, and active judging practices.  If we impose
a fact-finding duty on judges, perhaps we must also fashion clear rules to
guide the process of fact finding, such that pro se parties in a defensive pos-
ture are not forced to carry their opponent’s burden of proof.  Future studies
could look into other areas of law to understand how substantive legal con-
text affects active judging and the experiences of pro se litigants.
B. Rules of the Game
There is an unavoidable awkwardness in the reality of pro se parties
operating within the adversary system and attempting to wield its tools.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the context of civil procedure.  The
findings in this study raise the question, can we live with a system that for-
mally applies different rules to pro se litigants?  In a way, we have answered
this question in the affirmative already.  As we see in this study and others,
many judges already apply procedural rules differently, or not at all, when
dealing with pro se litigants.196  Thus, an informal two-tiered regime already
exists.
The informal solution we appear to have settled on has its risks, and it is
not clear that those risks have been systematically and intentionally assessed.
Recall the earlier example of the admissibility of a drug test report, a disposi-
tive piece of evidence.  In a two-tier system, where pro se parties need not
authenticate documents, but represented parties must, we would see differ-
ent case outcomes in this example.  Is this something we are willing to
accept?  If so, which set of rules should be followed in cases with imbalanced
representation?
These and other pressing questions about the rules of the game hang
over the access to justice conversation.  To date, the most common response
has been to suggest that judicial intervention and “court simplification” will
allow us to maintain the existing system while accommodating pro se liti-
gants,197 though some have challenged this idea and suggested new or modi-
fied rules,198 or a wholesale reworking of the system.199  Whatever our
195 See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 3.
196 Steinberg, supra note 11, at 906.
197 See id. at 905 (“Scholars have celebrated the accommodation approach for injecting
a measure of flexibility into the judicial role, but in fact, it papers over the depth of adver-
sary process failure in the civil trial courts.”).
198 See Engler, supra note 5, at 2022–23 (“The challenge to the adversary system, how-
ever, should not lead to an abandonment of its goals.  The adversarial system purports to
promote fairness and justice.  Yet, the rules currently operate as barriers preventing unrep-
resented litigants from participating meaningfully in the legal system and thereby frustrate
the goal of dispensing fairness and justice.  Given a choice between clinging to the rules at
the expense of the goal, or modifying the rules to further the goal, the rules must be
modified.” (footnote omitted)).
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normative views, the findings of this study confirm that individual judges are
forced to answer these difficult questions every single day, and often with
little in the way of meaningful guidance.
If our goal is to maintain an adversary system, we either have to accept
that pro se parties will be tripped up by procedural rules, or we have to
accept ad hoc practices and the informal application of procedural rules.
Alternatively, if we find this dichotomy is unsatisfying and unfair, we may
instead need to engage in a wholesale rethinking of our goals.  If the goal is
ensuring fairness and equal access to the courts, then perhaps we need to
reverse engineer a system designed to promote these values given the actual
users of the system (laypeople), as opposed to the aspirational users (law-
yers).  Surely, the time has come to engage in such a project, and fortunately,
some have already begun this work in earnest.200  To support reform
projects, we should know more about the interaction of active judging, pro se
parties, and procedural rules.201  More research in this area could shed light
on the question of how the rules and structure of our system should be
changed given the new pro se majority.
C. Consistency and Accountability
This research also raises questions about accountability, consistency, and
transparency in pro se courts and in active judging.  As my coresearchers and
I have argued elsewhere, in courts where lawyers are scarce, there are few to
no mechanisms to check or influence judicial discretion.202  In such a set-
ting, is there a need for a different set of mechanisms to check judicial behav-
ior?  Is a peer review system, such as that at OAH, sufficient for this purpose?
Without that system, might we see judging practices with even greater
variation?
Questions of accountability and transparency are particularly critical in
courts where hearings are not routinely recorded and decisions are not ren-
dered in writing, with full findings of law and fact, as these factors make
appeals difficult, if not impossible.203  But what of judicial discretion and
independence?  In a world where judges need training and guidance to man-
age pro se litigation, how do we create a system that ensures best practices are
followed, while maintaining judicial independence?  Does the independence
of the judiciary become less important in courts that lack skilled advocates to
check judicial discretion?  Future research and theoretical work could
explore these questions across a range of civil court settings.
199 Id. at 2023.
200 See Engler, supra note 5; Steinberg, supra note 11; Steinberg, supra note 1.
201 See Shanahan, supra note 22.
202 See Carpenter et al., supra note 8; Shanahan et al., supra note 21, at 1376.
203 See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
We face an incredibly challenging moment in American civil justice.
Given that a majority of those who appear in our state civil courts are without
counsel, we know our courts are not living up to the ideal of equal justice
under law.  It is clear the status quo must not persist.  Inevitably, the path to
resolving our access to justice crisis will be long and winding.  To find mean-
ingful solutions, we need a range of creative approaches and a willingness to
experiment on the part of all involved in the civil justice system and civil legal
services.
This Article offers a window into a small slice of the civil justice system, a
single court where a group of judges are doing their best, with the tools at
their disposal, to handle pro se cases fairly and impartially while also helping
those parties navigate the complexities of civil litigation.  Where they have
authoritative guidance, they do their best to follow it.  Where they lack gui-
dance, they make choices guided by principle and focus on being consistent
from case to case.  Their approaches are not monolithic, though they are
guided by shared values.  Most seem to recognize that they are imperfect and
working within an imperfect system.
Speaking with this group of judges gave this author some hope for the
future of our civil justice system.  The judges interviewed for this study are
principled people who approach their job with great seriousness, but many
are also willing to learn and to change when necessary.  The challenge for all
of us—judges, scholars, advocates, or policymakers—is to keep asking the
tough questions, gathering critical information, and sharing what we learn
with one another.  Those of us in the academy have much to offer by engag-
ing in research and scholarship aimed at understanding the operation of civil
justice in America.  The judges who are on the front lines of our civil justice
system every single day need and deserve our support, as do the people they
serve.
